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THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL
William Ewald*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE PROBLEM OF MADISON’S NOTES
The principal source for our knowledge of the drafting of
the Constitution is James Madison’s Notes of the debates in the
1
Philadelphia Convention of 1787. Other delegates—Robert
Yates, Rufus King, James McHenry, Alexander Hamilton—
from time to time kept a sketchy diary; and there is also the
official, but remarkably uninformative, Journal, which is little
more than a calendar of resolutions and votes. Madison stands
apart. He left behind a careful record, rich in anecdotal detail, of
each day’s proceedings, from the first straggling arrival of the
delegates in Philadelphia until the concluding ceremonies four
months later.
It is primarily to the Notes that we owe our knowledge of
the dramatic events, both human and intellectual, of that
summer: the silent but powerful presence of Washington in the
president’s chair; Edmund Randolph’s presentation on May 29
of the Virginia Plan; the initial testing of the waters as late* Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania. This work forms
a chapter in a forthcoming intellectual biography of James Wilson, and develops ideas
first broached in Ewald, infra note 42; that article provides additional background and
context, especially about Wilson’s wider role at the Convention. I am grateful to many
friends and colleagues for their comments: Greg Ablavsky, Matt Adler, Lee Arnold,
Randy Barnett, Richard Beeman, Mary Bilder, Steve Burbank, Martin Clagett, Tamara
Gaskell, Frank Goodman, Sally Gordon, Calvin Johnson, Pauline Maier, Bruce Mann,
Maeva Marcus, John Mikhail, Bill Nelson, Peter Onuf, Nick Pedersen, Jim Pfander,
Taylor Reveley, Kim Roosevelt, Ted Ruger, Justin Simard, Cathie Struve, Lorianne
Updike Toler, Jim Whitman, Dean Williams, and Mike Zuckerman. I am also grateful to
audiences at the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Virginia, the McNeil
Center for Early American Studies, the American Society for Legal History, and the
Zuckerman Salon.
1. Madison did not himself give a title to his manuscript notes from the 1787
Convention; they were first published four years after his death in THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON (H. D. Gilpin ed., 1840). Gilpin gave them the heading, “Debates in the
Federal Convention.” In conformity with standard usage, I refer to them as Madison’s
Notes.
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comers continued to arrive; the first skirmishes in early June
between the delegates from the small states and those from the
large; Franklin’s efforts to cool tempers; then, on June 15, the
submission, on behalf of the small states, of the New Jersey plan.
This submission was followed by more than a month of increasingly acrimonious debate that brought proceedings to a standstill
and threatened to derail the Convention altogether. The arguments of the “great debate” were punctuated by the inebriated
discourse of Luther Martin and the day-long speech of
Hamilton. Then, finally, on July 16, the controversy was resolved
by the adoption of the “Connecticut Compromise.” After July 16
the mood seems to have lightened, and the delegates turned
their attention to less contentious matters. The Convention
adjourned for ten days to let the Committee of Detail arrange
the work that had so far been accomplished and resumed
business on August 6. But this period of relative calm was to be
interrupted once more in the middle of August as the delegates
clashed again, this time primarily over the issue of the slave
trade. A second, less honorable, compromise was reached. Then
came the final negotiations, the polishing of the text by
Gouverneur Morris, the signing ceremony on September 17, and
the extraordinary concluding speech by Benjamin Franklin.
Without Madison we would know little of these episodes:
and the Notes form the backbone of the standard scholarly
reference, Max Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention of
2
1787. Remarkably, Madison recorded his Notes while he was
himself serving as one of the most active members of the
Convention—regularly proposing motions, making arguments,
answering objections. As Jefferson wrote to John Adams in
1815, “Do you know that there exists in manuscript the ablest
work of this kind ever yet executed, of the debates of the
constitutional convention of Philadelphia in 1788 [sic]? The
whole of every thing said and done there was taken down by Mr.
3
Madison, with a labor and exactness beyond comprehension.”
2. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter CONVENTION RECORDS]. Farrand’s original three-volume work was
re-issued in 1937; by that time, he had discovered enough further documentation to fill a
fourth volume. In 1987, James H. Hutson took the somewhat disorganized materials in
Farrand’s fourth volume and combined them with newly-discovered materials into his
SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENT]. Farrand’s first three
volumes were re-issued at that time; so the current edition consists of the first three
volumes and the Hutson SUPPLEMENT. The earlier volume four is now superseded.
3. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 421 (letter of Jefferson to Adams of
August 10, 1815).
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Jefferson’s admiration is fully justified. Nevertheless, as
historians have long recognized, the Notes have serious
limitations. In the first place, they are incomplete. They do not
record the inner workings of the Convention’s various subcommittees, even if Madison was a member. They scarcely mention
the (no doubt incessant) discussions and bargaining that took
place out of doors. Even as a record of what was said on the
floor of the State House they are manifestly deficient. The
Convention met for at least five hours a day, and frequently
4
longer. But a typical entry in the Notes can easily be read aloud
in ten minutes. The Notes, in other words, are not a transcription
of what the delegates said, but something quite different. They
are, inevitably, a summary of what Madison understood the
delegates to have said, and, beyond that, of what he judged
sufficiently important to record. These facts are often
overlooked; and writers who parse the speeches in the Notes as
though they are direct quotations are making an elementary
error.
Because of these limitations, historians of the Convention
have labored to fill in the background, to get behind Madison’s
record of events; and a comparison of Farrand’s influential
monograph (published in 1913, and still in print) with Richard
Beeman’s comprehensive treatment a century later will show the
5
progress that has been made. About the general background—
about the biographies of the delegates, about the social and
economic setting, about politics and ideology, about the place of
the Convention in American history—we know incomparably
more. But the study of the primary texts of the Convention has
languished and has remained more or less where Farrand and
6
Jameson left it a century ago.
4. Washington recorded in his diary that the Convention met “not less than five,
for a large part of the time six, and sometimes 7 hours sitting every day.” 3 CONVENTION
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 81. Strictly speaking, most of these meetings were meetings of
the Committee of the Whole, which was entitled to follow more flexible parliamentary
rules than the Convention. In order to avoid confusing the Committee of the Whole with
the Committee of Detail, I shall speak of “the Convention” throughout.
5. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (1913); RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2009).
6. The primary texts reporting the work of the Convention itself, especially
Madison’s Notes, were printed in Farrand’s first two volumes; those two volumes have
not been altered since the edition of 1911. CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2. The
same is true for the background materials Farrand collected in his volume three. The new
material discovered since 1911 (much of it found by Farrand) is background information
in the form of letters, family anecdotes, and the like, almost all of it postdating the
Convention; these materials appear in the 1987 Hutson SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2.
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But there is a further and more subterranean problem. The
Notes are far too polished to have been written as the speeches
themselves were being delivered on the floor. Madison says that
he jotted down notes, now lost, which he worked up later into
the version we possess today. His own account emphasizes that
the working-up occurred immediately: “losing not a moment
unnecessarily between the adjournment and reassembling of the
Convention I was enabled to write out my daily notes during the
7
session or within a few finishing days after its close.” But
Farrand pointed out that Madison sometime after 1819 altered
his Notes to bring them into conformity with the published
Journal, and there has long been a question about the extent and
8
the timing of the revisions.
This issue was raised in the early 1950s by William Crosskey
of the University of Chicago. Crosskey charged—explicitly in his
classes, somewhat more circumspectly in print—that Madison
had engaged, years later, in a wholesale re-writing of his Notes,
and that the intent was to burnish his political reputation. In
9
other words, James Madison was “a forger.” Crosskey did not
present persuasive evidence for his claims, which were widely
dismissed; and in 1986 James Hutson concluded from a close
examination of the original Madison manuscripts that the
10
charges were baseless.
There, for a time, matters rested. But recently Mary Bilder,
using new techniques of documentary analysis, has re-opened
the question. Her forthcoming book examines the question of
the Madison manuscript in detail, although she stops well short
11
of Crosskey’s more extreme claims. The issues here go well
beyond Madison. They raise the fundamental question, rarely
discussed in the legal literature, of the reliability of the documentary evidence: of its accuracy, of its completeness, and of its
7. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at xvi.
8. Farrand discusses the alterations to the Madison manuscript in 1 CONVENTION
RECORDS, supra note 2, at xv–xix. The changes that Farrand discusses were principally to
bring his tallies of votes into line with the published Journal. But Madison also made
about fifty insertions from the published notes of Yates—this even though he knew them
to be unreliable.
9. The Crosskey charges are discussed in SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at xx–xxv.
See generally WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953).
10. James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (1986).
11. MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION (forthcoming). The possibility of a subsequent re-writing has also been
raised on independent grounds by BEEMAN, supra note 5, at 85, 98.
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integrity. Put bluntly: How much confidence are we entitled to
place in any purported reconstruction of the events of 1787?
How much do we know—how much indeed can we know—
about the making of the Constitution?
B. THE PROBLEM OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL
I wish here to focus on one neglected aspect of this problem.
Madison’s Notes contain a lengthy gap, encompassing ten days at
the end of July and the beginning of August. During this time
the Convention stood adjourned while the Committee of Detail
re-worked the miscellaneous Convention resolutions into a
single document. The gap itself is well known; but its
significance, in my view, has been underestimated. The
Committee is typically treated in a page or two, as an interlude
between the more dramatic events on either side. My first claim
is that this widespread view is a mistake. This ten-day gap in
Madison’s Notes was arguably the most creative period of
constitutional drafting of the entire summer. Certainly, day for
day, it was the most intensive. Far from being a mere interlude,
at least in certain respects, and for certain fundamental issues, it
was the main event.
But the deeper interest of this example lies elsewhere. It
raises acute questions of evidence: first, and most obviously,
about the physical documents, about their completeness and
reliability. But it raises as well another and subtler set of
questions—not now about the reliability of the documents, but
about the way those documents have been handled and
understood by subsequent scholarship. Briefly: How could the
full significance of the Committee of Detail have been
overlooked? A detailed historiography of the Committee lies
beyond the scope of this article, and I shall postpone it to
another occasion. But a great deal turns on the history of the
documents themselves—on the gaps in Madison’s Notes, and on
the fact that the Committee documents came to light in a
haphazard fashion. It is important to remember, as one examines
Farrand’s polished volumes, that the materials he so carefully
assembled were not always available. They came to light at
different times; their availability to scholars, or their absence,
had an effect on historical interpretation; and a particular
interpretation, once established, can take on a life of its own.
Farrand was confronted with an untidy mass of papers, widely
scattered. He was forced, as any scholar in such a situation
would be forced, to make editorial choices—choices about what
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to include, where to place it, what to emphasize. Of necessity, his
choices were guided by his own understanding of the events of
the Convention; and those choices in turn have guided the
direction of subsequent research. Even the polish of the volumes
can be deceptive: words on the printed page make a different
impression than a hasty scrawl on a scrap of paper in the
archives. The Committee of Detail offers a striking illustration of
these points, and of the way in which the seemingly mundane
details of archival research and textual editing can influence our
understanding of the drafting of the Constitution.
But let us now turn our attention to the Committee itself.
1. Formation of the Committee of Detail
The Committee came about as follows. The delegates to the
Convention, after the climacteric vote of July 16, were
exhausted. They had been in session, six days a week, for nearly
two months, and had spent more than half that time in
acrimonious deadlock. Only the bare outline of a Constitution
had so far been settled, and the delegates were in ill temper. It
was evident that a great deal of work still lay ahead. In addition,
12
the weather in late July had grown “very warme,” and many
delegates had business or family to attend to. It was time for a
break. Elbridge Gerry on Tuesday, July 24, moved the
appointment of a committee to draw up a Constitution
13
“conformable to the Resolutions passed by the Convention.”
Ominously, immediately before the vote, General Pinckney of
South Carolina “reminded the Convention that if the Committee
should fail to insert some security to the Southern States agst. an
emancipation of slaves, and taxes on exports, he shd. be bound
14
by duty to his State to vote agst. their Report.” The Convention
then voted unanimously to appoint a five-member Committee,
which they informally referred to as the “Committee of Detail”
or “the Committee of Five.”
The Committee members were selected at the close of business the following day. They were evidently chosen with an eye
to geographical balance: Nathaniel Gorham (Massachusetts);
Oliver Ellsworth (Connecticut); James Wilson (Pennsylvania);
Edmund Randolph (Virginia); John Rutledge (South Carolina).
12. SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 332.
13. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 85–87, 95–97; the language quoted is
at 106.
14. Id. at 95.
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Madison (for reasons I shall discuss later) was not selected. Four
of the five were eminent lawyers. Randolph was later to serve as
Washington’s Attorney General. Wilson, Ellsworth, and
Rutledge all were appointed by Washington to sit on the
Supreme Court; Rutledge and Ellsworth both briefly served as
Chief Justice. (Gorham, the odd man out, was a businessman.)
Also on Tuesday it was decided to refer to the Committee, in
addition to the Convention resolutions, the New Jersey plan and
the plan submitted to the Convention by Charles Pinckney on
May 29, which apparently had not been heard of since he
introduced it.
There is no suggestion, in any of the surviving scraps of
evidence, that the Committee was to have carte blanche. The
expectation appears to have been (as Washington noted in his
diary) that the Committee would “arrange, and draw into
method & form the several matters which had been agreed to by
15
the Convention, as a Constitution for the United States.” The
Convention continued to meet through Thursday, July 26, at
which point it voted to adjourn for ten days. That would give the
Committee time to prepare its Report. The other delegates
would have a break. The adjournment and the appointment of
16
the Committee were reported in the local papers. The
Committee met; it prepared a draft of a Constitution, which was
secretly printed for distribution to the delegates; this printed
Report served as the basis for the Convention’s deliberations in
August and September. Madison’s Notes cease on July 26; he
resumes the narrative with the submission of the Committee’s
Report to the full Convention on Monday, August 6. About the
internal workings of the Committee he says nothing.
2. History of the Documents
The Constitutional Convention closed its doors on
September 17. As its last official act before the signing, it
ordered that the official Journal (kept by the Secretary, William
Jackson) be turned over to George Washington; the rule of
17
secrecy would remain in vigor. Later that day, Jackson wrote to
15. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 65 (diary entry for July 27). For
further scraps, see infra, note 50 and accompanying text.
16. THE PHILADELPHIA PACKET AND DAILY ADVERTISER, July 30, 1787, at 3. The
importance of this rare lapse from the rule of secrecy should not be exaggerated. There
was little choice: otherwise, how to explain to an anxious public the sudden appearance
during the day of so many delegates on the streets of Philadelphia?
17. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 648.
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Washington that “Major Jackson, after burning all the loose
scraps of paper which belong to the Convention, will this
evening wait upon the General with the Journals and other
papers which their vote directs to be delivered to His
18
Excellency.”
In the years that followed, the rule of secrecy surrounding
the Convention was strictly observed. There is the odd scrap
here and there—a remark in private correspondence, or a family
anecdote—but in essence the public knew nothing whatsoever
about the internal debates of 1787. Nor was it much enlightened
when, in 1819, Congress authorized the publication of the
Journal, which turned out to be little more than a list of motions
and of votes recorded by state. It gives almost no information
about the debates or about the contributions of the individual
delegates.
The great change came in 1840, when Madison’s Notes were
published. Now, fifty-three years after the Convention, after the
last of the delegates had died, the public finally (it seemed) had a
reliable record of events inside the Convention—a contemporaneous record, made with remarkable industry by the revered
late President.
Over the next four decades the documentary situation did
not greatly change. The story of the Convention told in the Notes
(and then powerfully reinforced by George Bancroft’s
19
magisterial History of the Formation of the Constitution )
dominated the historical understanding. Meanwhile, letters and
diaries, such as they were, passed from children to grandchildren; some ended in the historical archives that were just
then being established. One such set of papers was given in 1876
to the Historical Society of Pennsylvania (“HSP”) by Emily
Hollingsworth of Philadelphia, the granddaughter of James
Wilson. How they came to their present location is a story worth
telling, if only as a reminder of the precariousness of the
20
evidence.
18. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 82.
19. GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1882).
20. The discussion that follows is based on an inspection of the documents at the
HSP; the correspondence between the director of the HSP and Hollingsworth is located
in volume two of the Wilson archive. The original documents for the Committee of
Detail are photographically reproduced, with a facing-page transcription, in William
Ewald & Lorianne Updike Toler, Early Drafts of the U.S. Constitution, 135 PA. MAG. OF
HIST. AND BIOG. 227 (2011) [hereinafter COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS]. Updike Toler’s
Addendum to that article discusses the history of the Wilson documents (including
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Wilson died a bankrupt in 1798. His library and many of his
possessions were sold to pay his creditors. His private papers
passed to his son, Bird Wilson (himself a lawyer and later a
distinguished clergyman). Bird used a selection of the papers to
prepare an edition of his father’s Works, which appeared in 1804.
There is no evidence that Bird was aware that he had in his
possession early drafts of the Constitution. This is not altogether
surprising. Because of the strict rule of secrecy, Wilson would
never have discussed the proceedings of the Convention with his
son. The papers themselves contain no indication that they
belong to the work of the Committee of Detail and are not
overtly dated to 1787. To all appearances, they are simply
untitled documents, mixed in among the other Wilson papers.
There would have been no way for Bird to know what they
represented.
On Bird’s death, the papers went to his niece (and Wilson’s
granddaughter) Emily Hollingsworth. In June, 1876, she donated
to the HSP some papers pertaining both to her uncle and to her
grandfather. A few months later the director wrote back to say
the donation was a bit “thin,” and asked whether she had
additional papers. Hollingsworth thereupon made a further
donation from her grandfather’s estate. Did she understand that,
in one or the other of these donations, she was turning over the
original manuscript drafts of the Constitution? Apparently not.
She mentions as especially noteworthy an entirely commonplace
letter from George Washington, and her covering letter
concludes, “Do not feel obliged to retain any of the Papers you
deem inadmissible to the repositories of your Society . . . .” The
archivists at the HSP appear to have had no better
understanding of what they had been given. Her donation was
handed to a bookbinder, and sewn into two volumes; the damage
to some of the more fragile sheets is evident. The Wilson papers
at the HSP then appear to have been entirely overlooked by
historians for more than two decades.
So, more than a century after the Philadelphia Convention,
essentially all that was known about the Committee of Detail
was contained in Madison’s brief treatment in the Notes. He
records that the Committee was appointed, lists its members,
and reproduces the final printed Report; but about the
intervening ten days historians possessed no information.
additional donations that came after Hollingsworth’s death), both before and after their
arrival at the HSP.
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3. Re-discovery of the Committee Documents
In 1899, William M. Meigs published his study of the
Convention. It is not itself a significant work; but it proudly
announced the discovery of a document in the hand of Edmund
Randolph, found among the papers of George Mason, which
Meigs correctly identified as an early draft of the Constitution
21
made at the time of the Committee of Detail. How the draft
came to be in the Mason papers is unknown. Meigs noted that
“[o]ne other draft [of the Constitution] is known to exist” among
the Wilson papers at the HSP: note his use of the singular. This
seems to be the first mention in print of any of the Wilson
22
drafts.
Meigs did not pursue his own hint, and it appears he did not
23
trouble to look closely at the Wilson archive. Soon thereafter a
much more considerable scholar, J. Franklin Jameson, identified
among the HSP papers not only Wilson’s successive drafts (in
the plural) of the Constitution, but also a copy in his handwriting
of the Convention resolutions, and, most surprisingly, a set of
extracts, also in Wilson’s handwriting, that Jameson, in a fine
piece of close textual analysis, was able to identify as extracts
from the New Jersey plan and from the original Pinckney plan.
Shortly after Jameson, Andrew C. McLaughlin identified in the
Wilson papers a second and longer set of extracts from the
24
Pinckney plan.
These new documents from Randolph and Wilson are our
most important source of information about the inner workings
of the Committee of Detail and are the most significant archival
discovery since the publication of Madison’s Notes. Max Farrand
21. WILLIAM M. MEIGS, THE GROWTH OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 317–24 (2d ed. 1900) (announcing discovery of the draft). At
the time Meigs wrote, the draft was in the possession of Mason’s great-granddaughter,
see id. at 4; today it is in the Library of Congress.
22. Id. at 324.
23. Meigs’s book re-arranges the events of the Convention by individual clauses of
the Constitution, thereby enabling the reader to follow the emergence of any particular
clause. Id. at 7–10. In effect, it is a book-length index. He describes the Wilson draft as
being almost identical to the final Committee report; and for that reason he appears to
have regarded it as containing little new information for his project. Id. at 324. Somehow
he overlooked the other documents in the Hollingsworth collection. I note that Meigs
makes it clear in his preface that he was a resident of Philadelphia: he could easily have
looked. Id. at 6.
24. Jameson’s various textual studies are collected in J.F. Jameson, Studies in the
History of the Federal Convention of 1787, in 1 ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE AMERICAN
HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1902, at 87 (1903). McLaughlin’s contribution
on the Pinckney Plan appeared as an unsigned note. See Note, Sketch of Pinckney’s Plan
for a Constitution, 1787, 9 AM. HIST. REV. 735 (1904).
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carefully collated the new documents and presented them in his
magisterial 1911 Records (which, incidentally, he dedicated to
Jameson). One might have thought that such a discovery, in the
hands of scholars of the caliber of Jameson and Farrand, would
have led to a re-appraisal of the work of the Committee. But
that did not happen. Their interests lay elsewhere. Jameson in
particular turned his energies to clearing up the mystery
surrounding the Pinckney plan, whose original had been lost,
25
presumably in Major Jackson’s bonfire. He was able, using the
Wilson extracts, to reconstruct the proposals that Pinckney had
26
submitted in 1787.
4. Historiography of the Committee
But beyond this painstaking analysis of the documents,
Jameson and Farrand did not attempt to go. They made no
effort to reconstruct the exact sequence of events within the
27
Committee. Farrand’s influential 1913 monograph essentially
recapitulates the story told by Bancroft, though with a greater
mastery of the documents. The focus of his account is on the
events on the floor of the Convention and especially on the
“great debate.” He treats the Committee of Detail in a short
28
chapter of eleven paragraphs.
The leading historians of the Convention have been equally
brief. Charles Warren in 1928 gives the Committee of Detail
29
four pages. Andrew McLaughlin in 1935 disposes of it in a
30
31
single footnote. Irving Brant, writing in 1950, gives it one page.
25. The background is complex. Essentially, Pinckney had submitted a plan which
he subsequently, and implausibly, claimed to have been the plan followed by the
Convention; but the text of his original plan was lost. This led to considerable
controversy, summarized in BEEMAN, supra note 5, at 92–99.
26. The fullest reconstruction is given by Farrand. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 2, at 595–609. The results were something of a surprise. On the one hand, Jameson
was able to show (as Bancroft and others had suspected) that the 1818 document was not
what Pinckney had presented it as being. On the other hand, it turned out that many
elements of Pinckney’s plan had in fact found their way into the report of the Committee,
and thence into the final Constitution. So the plan was not (as many had assumed) simply
“smothered” by sending it to Committee. Jameson, supra note 24, at 131.
27. Jameson explicitly set such matters to one side, and noted that his “present
concern [was] only with its bearing on the problem of the Pinckney plan . . . .” Id. at 127.
28. Farrand, supra note 5, at 124–33.
29. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 384-87 (1928).
Warren’s treatment is less careful than Farrand’s; he gives Randolph “the lion’s share” of
the credit for the final Report, which is not a plausible interpretation of the documents.
30. ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 180 (1935).
31. IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1800,
at 111–12 (1950). Although the pagination splits the discussion onto two pages, the length
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Clinton Rossiter in 1966 gives it two pages. The Colliers, twenty
33
years later, also give it two pages. The most recent treatment of
the Committee—also the fullest and most balanced—is that by
Richard Beeman in 2009. He devotes to it a chapter of eighteen
pages. The first dozen give circumstantial background and
discuss the biographies of its members; the final pages
34
summarize the substance of its final report. As for legal
scholarship, the most recent edition of Hart & Wechsler,
35
following the example of the historians, gives it three sentences.
The only extended discussion of the Committee’s work I
have been able to locate is an article by John C. Hueston,
published in 1990. Hueston notes with surprise the paucity of
scholarship; correctly identifies the specifically legal importance
of the Committee’s contributions (especially in the area of statefederal relations); and concludes that the Committee, on this
36
fundamental matter, “altered the course of the Convention.”
Hueston’s article appeared as a student Note in the Yale Law
Journal and appears to have been entirely overlooked by later
scholars.
We are thus left with a curious situation. Farrand’s Records
37
reproduce fully sixty pages of complex Committee documents.
But (Hueston apart) none of the historical accounts attempts to
grapple with the technical intricacies. None attempts to develop
Jameson’s observation, made already in 1903, that “Not a little
instruction might be derived from this record of the transmutations which our fundamental document, or its germ, underwent

is one page.
32. CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 200–01 (1966). Rossiter
attempts to sketch the stages through which the Committee proceeded in a single
paragraph: as will become clear from the discussion below, I believe he reconstructs the
events inaccurately.
33. CHRISTOPHER COLLIER & JAMES LINCOLN COLLIER, DECISION IN
PHILADELPHIA: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 168–69 (1986).
34. BEEMAN, supra note 5, at 258–76.
35. HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 5–6
(6th ed., Richard Fallon et al. eds., 2009). It is there asserted that the Committee’s work
was based in part on “a report drafted in 1781 by a committee of the Continental
Congress that had sought to revise the Articles of Confederation.” This assertion is taken
from WARREN, supra note 29; although Warren points to some analogies, his assertion of
influence is unsupported by the documentary evidence.
36. John C. Hueston, Altering the Course of the Constitutional Convention: The
Role of the Committee of Detail in Establishing the Balance of Federal and State Powers,
100 YALE L.J. 765, 782 (1990). For my reservations about Hueston’s analysis, see infra
note 133. I broached these issues at length in an article published in 2008; for my
reservations about my own analysis, see infra note 42.
37. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 129–89.
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during these eleven [sic] days at the hands of the committee.”
The Committee is typically treated as an interlude. Plainly, the
center of historical curiosity lies elsewhere. Perhaps in the
background there is a sense that the Committee was merely
tidying up loose ends: only concerned, as it were, with “details.”
5. What the Committee Did
It is not difficult to show that more needs to be said. For
terminological convenience it will be helpful to divide the
Convention into three “Acts.” Act I covers everything that
occurred through July 26. Act II is the Committee of Detail; and
Act III is everything that happened afterwards, from August 6
through the signing on September 17.
I mentioned that most discussions of the Committee’s work
in the leading monographs take no more than a page or two. The
discussions of Act I and Act III typically run to several hundred
pages. That this is inadequate can perhaps most readily be seen
as follows. The Virginia resolutions introduced by Edmund
Randolph at the end of May fill three pages in Farrand’s printed
edition. Two months later, at the end of July, the Convention
resolutions delivered to the Committee of Detail fill six pages. In
other words, by the end of Act I, after prolonged debate, the
Convention had managed, roughly speaking, to add three pages
to Madison’s plan. The Committee of Detail then went to work.
It labored for a little over a week. Its draft of the Constitution
fills twelve pages—adding six pages, and doubling the length.
The Convention then resumed business and worked for a further
six weeks. The result was the final version of the Constitution,
which fills fifteen of Farrand’s pages. Page for page, and day for
day, the Committee of Detail was the most intense period of
drafting of the entire summer.
These facts are of course not by themselves dispositive. It
might turn out that the Committee contributions were insignificant, or that they were later rejected by the Convention: and in
some cases that is what happened. Still, as every lawyer knows,
the power to draft even a common contract, let alone a constitution, is the power to shape the contours and the language and
the emphases of the document; and, in the case of the
Committee of Detail, it was also the power to structure the
ensuing debates of Act III.

38. Jameson, supra note 24, at 127.
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So one needs to inspect the substance. The most
fundamental contributions of the Committee may be roughly
divided into two categories. The first category is a set of
provisions relating to slavery and navigation acts—the issues that
General Pinckney had raised just before the Committee was
established. These provisions were to embroil the Convention in
deep acrimony during Act III. That acrimony and its source in
the Committee Report is well known and looms large in the
39
standard histories of the Convention.
The second category is the one on which I wish to focus. It is
a set of more technically legal provisions. The Committee
introduced to the Constitution a number of fundamental structural features. The most important are as follows. It introduced
an explicit enumeration of congressional powers. It introduced a
list of powers prohibited to the states. It introduced the
Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Supremacy Clause. It
gave the first detailed specification of the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. It added the clause on privileges and immunities,
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the guarantee of
republican government. It refined many of the powers of the
chief executive, especially in relation to Congress. These
matters, although some of them had antecedents in the Articles
or the state constitutions, had scarcely been discussed by the
Convention in Act I. They were the accomplishment of the
Committee of Detail; and, with remarkably little discussion,
their substance went more-or-less unchanged into the final text
of the Constitution. And they are hardly “details.” They
represent, in fact, the very core of American federalism: the
distinctive contribution of the Philadelphia Convention to
western constitutional governance.
It may be helpful here to distinguish between the history of
the Convention and the history of constitutional law. Act I, with
its bitter arguments over proportional representation, belongs
primarily to the history of the Convention. The Connecticut
Compromise is unquestionably important. Without it, the
Convention would have collapsed. But from the point of view of
constitutional law it is of little significance. It has given rise to no
extensive body of litigation. If it could be altered—if voting
strength in the Senate were more nearly proportional to
population—perhaps the new system would be somewhat more
39. The leading discussion is by BEEMAN, supra note 5, who gives extensive
references to the monograph literature.
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democratic. But the United States and its constitutional system
would be recognizably the same. That is not true for the
structural contributions of the Committee of Detail. Without the
enumeration of powers, without the Necessary and Proper
Clause, the shape of the federal government would be radically
different. Without the architecture of the federal courts, judicial
review would be radically different. Without the Supremacy
Clause, it would probably not exist. And so on down the list. The
high drama of Act I has attracted most of the scholarly attention:
but from the point of view of constitutional law, Act II is
unquestionably more important.
6. Central Questions
These observations raise a host of questions. First we have a
set of questions concerning the work of the Committee of Detail
itself. How were these structural provisions inserted into the
draft of the Constitution? Is there a relationship between the
structural provisions and the slavery provisions? Which members of the Committee were principally responsible for the
drafting? What were they intending to achieve? Were they
acting ultra vires? Did they have a hidden agenda? Were they
divided among themselves or did they act as a unit? Did they
have a chairman? How, in concrete terms, did they go about the
task of drafting? Did they write the drafts sitting together as a
group or did they delegate the task to one of their number?
What are we to make of the fact that most of the documents are
in Wilson’s hand? Does this show him to have been the principal
author? Why was Madison not a member? Did the Committee
do its work in secret or did it consult with other delegates? On
what resources did it draw? What documents did it have at its
disposal and what are the legal and intellectual sources for its
contributions?
Behind these primary questions about the Committee lurks
a second group of questions about evidence. What documents do
we possess? How were they made and for what purpose? What
was their subsequent history and how did they come to be where
they are today? Are they complete? How have they been
handled by editors and textual scholars? I take it to be obvious
that our confidence in the answers to the primary questions must
depend in large part on how we answer the secondary questions.
40. This is the position of ROBERT DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION? (2001).
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This much is straightforward. But there is also a
considerably more puzzling tertiary question. The documents I
have mentioned are all available in Farrand’s Records. If it is
true that the work of the Committee of Detail was of such
fundamental importance, why was that fact not noticed long
ago? Why have the primary questions not been asked with
greater insistence?
7. Historiography Revisited
A full answer to that tertiary question would take us far
beyond the bounds of this Article, and I postpone it to another
occasion. But for now let us consider more closely the interpretations of the Committee of Detail offered by the leading
41
scholars. Farrand’s early analysis of 1913 is sober and careful.
He makes some plausible conjectures (which he is careful to
label as conjectures) about how the Committee did its work. His
account does not stray far from the documents: and he had the
advantage of having worked closely with the originals. He points
out correctly that the Committee made extensive use of the
Articles of Confederation; and he carefully describes the
organization of the final Committee draft. He briefly mentions
the slave-trade provisions and the enumeration of powers;
surprisingly, he does not notice the Necessary and Proper
Clause, or the Supremacy Clause. He does not attempt to
analyze the likely contributions of the individual members or to
work out in detail the sequence of events. His account is
accurate as far as it goes; but it leaves most of the primary
questions unaddressed.
Farrand was evidently aware of the need for a closer study
of the Committee texts. He could not possibly have thought his
brief sketch would be the last word on the subject. But,
ironically, the very transcriptions of the Committee documents
that he for the first time made available in the Records may
themselves have inhibited later scholarship. Not that Farrand
was careless. The documents are arranged in the correct
chronological sequence; his transcriptions are painstaking and,
for the most part, accurate. The problem lies elsewhere. The
original drafts contain frequent deletions and insertions and
marginal comments—sometimes in the hand of Wilson,
sometimes of Rutledge, sometimes of Randolph. Farrand
(perhaps constrained by his publisher) rendered these altera41.

FARRAND, supra note 5, at 124–33.
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tions by a typographical system of italics and brackets that
makes it almost impossible to understand what is happening.
Comments that in the original are interlineated and assigned to a
specific point in the text are rendered indistinguishable from
marginal comments assigned to no point in particular: one loses
sense of what goes with what, and of the exact sequence of the
changes. The task of working out the textual issues is laborious,
even if one has access to the original manuscripts. If one relies
on the published transcriptions, it becomes far more difficult:
42
almost impossible. At any rate, and for whatever reason, later
scholars did not subject the documents themselves to further
close scrutiny.
As we move beyond these textual matters and consider the
substance of what historians have said about the Committee and
its internal workings, we find—to put it mildly—no unanimity.
There are five principal theories. (1) The Committee Theory.
One group of historians (Farrand is an example) treats the
members of the Committee as a more-or-less undifferentiated
whole and does not try to calculate the contributions of
individual members. (2) The James Wilson Theory. Another
group (apparently influenced by the observation that most of the
Committee Documents are in his handwriting) takes James
Wilson to be the Committee mastermind. Brant, for example,
treating Wilson as a surrogate for Madison, says, “On the
straight drafting job, this might be called a committee of Wilson
and four others. With Wilson on, it mattered little that Madison
43
was off.” (3) The Rutledge-and-the-Slave-Power Theory. For
over eighty years, the early historians of the Convention—
Bancroft, Farrand, Brant, Rossiter—paid little attention to the
issue of slavery. But after the 1960s the focus of historical
research began to change. The spotlight shifted to the slavery
42. Credite vulnerato. In an article about James Wilson published in 2008 I called
attention to the importance of the Committee of Detail and, dividing the Convention
into three “Acts,” argued that Act II was fully as consequential as Act I or Act III. I then
attempted to piece together its internal workings. William Ewald, James Wilson and the
Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 901, 983–93 (2008). At the time I
relied on Farrand’s transcriptions; and although the general analysis still seems to me
correct, a close examination of the originals quickly made it clear that I had badly
understated the contributions of Randolph and somewhat overstated those of Wilson.
That 2008 article supplies background for the present study, especially for Wilson’s role
in Act I and for his relations with Madison; but the portion dealing with the Committee
of Detail is superseded. New transcriptions and a photographic reproduction of the
manuscripts are provided in COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20.
43. BRANT, supra note 31, at 111. Others who take a similar view are Clinton
Rossiter, Charles Page Smith, and Nicholas Pedersen. Nicholas Pedersen, The Lost
Founder: James Wilson in American Memory, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 257 (2010).
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provisions, and John Rutledge rather than Wilson now becomes
the Committee mastermind. Rossiter as late as 1966 could write
(incidentally, without adducing any evidence) that Rutledge, as
Committee chairman, “kept his colleagues hard at work [and]
reduced controversy to a minimum.” But a few years later
Rutledge, far from “reducing controversy,” stood accused of
aggressively defending the interests of the Slave Power. “The
report of the Committee of Detail,” wrote Donald Robinson in
44
1971, “was a monument to Southern craft and gall.” This view
has been influential; and David Stuart in 2007 discusses the
Committee under the chapter title, “Rutledge Hijacks the
45
Constitution.” (4) The Rutledge-Wilson Theory. Others, while
rejecting the “hijacking” thesis, emphasize the alleged close
friendship between Wilson and Rutledge, who are seen as the
46
two dominant spirits of the Committee. (5) The States’ Rights
Theory. Hueston advances a different sort of “hijack thesis.” On
his account the larger Convention had favored a “stronger
national model” in which the legislature would exercise a
general grant of legislative authority; but the five members of
the Committee, all adherents of “states’ rights,” worked to place
limitations on the national model, and in particular to add the
47
constraint of an enumeration of powers.
This is a remarkable range of interpretations. It is perhaps
evident that not all the theories can be correct: what is more
surprising is that none of them is. And it is not terribly hard to
see what has happened. The historians are interested in
something else—the Connecticut Compromise, or slavery, or the
social background of the Convention—at any rate, not in
technical law, and not in what Rossiter, in a chapter title, called
“Details, details, details.” So when they come to the Committee
they treat it briskly and substitute an interpretation that fits their
own preoccupations.

44. DONALD ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS,
1765–1820, at 218 (1971). Or again: “The Convention could not have produced at this
critical point an intersectional committee in whose hands the interests of slave owners
would have been safer.” Id. at 217.
45. DAVID STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787, at 163–75 (2007).
46. This is essentially the position of Richard Beeman; BEEMAN, supra note 5, at
269. Beeman, in my view correctly, rejects the overstatements of Stewart and the
“hijack” school (id. at 478). This is also the position of SMITH, infra note 158, and
perhaps ROSSITER, supra note 32 at 201, as well, unfortunately, as Ewald, supra note 42.
For the factual problems, see infra, notes 157–158.
47. Hueston, supra note 36.
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At bottom, what is missing is three things: first, a clear
realization of the specifically legal importance of the contributions of Act II; secondly, an understanding of the
complexities involved in trying to piece together the internal
workings of the Committee; thirdly, recourse to the original
documents.
My concern here is with what I earlier called the primary
and secondary questions: with attempting to reconstruct, so far
as is possible, the workings and the contributions of the
Committee of Detail, and with assessing the quality of the
documentary evidence. This is a long Article; even so, it should
be stressed that it is by no means complete. One important
subplot—the presence of the Pinckney extracts in the Wilson
archive—requires such a lengthy analysis that I have omitted it
entirely. Many lesser matters also have had to be left to one side:
the aim here is to concentrate on the fundamentals. The
Historical Society of Pennsylvania provided access to the
original documents in the Wilson collection; and the Library of
Congress made available scanned images of the Randolph
48
draft.
About the tertiary question I shall have little to say. No
doubt the neglect of the Committee of Detail has something to
do with the great literary merits of Madison’s Notes: with the
drama of the debates, with the colorful anecdotes, with the
unforgettable cast of characters. The Notes are Technicolor: the
records of the Committee of Detail are black-and-white, and in
many respects a silent picture. But although these facts
undoubtedly play a role, they do not seem to me to provide,
even remotely, an adequate explanation. The issues here (I
believe) lie extremely deep; but they lie beyond the scope of this
Article, and I shall defer them to another time.
II. THE COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS
A. OVERVIEW OF THE DOCUMENTS
Because we do not have Madison’s Notes to guide us, the
interpretation of the work of the Committee depends on a close
48. These are transcribed with photographic reproductions in CONVENTION
DOCUMENTS, supra note 20. For the convenience of readers I also give references to the
corresponding pages in Farrand’s CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2; if there are
discrepancies, that is because Farrand’s transcriptions are being corrected sub silentio.
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inspection of papers that were not written for the convenience of
historians. Let me start by saying something about these
Committee documents in general and then examine them oneby-one.
The first document (the one identified by Meigs) is in the
handwriting of Edmund Randolph, with comments in the
distinctive, spiky hand of John Rutledge. The document consists
of five sheets of paper, written (except for the last sheet) on both
sides. This document is currently housed at the Library of
Congress.
All the other Committee documents are in the Wilson
archive at the HSP, and all are in Wilson’s handwriting. They
contain, first, a list, on a single folio sheet, folded to make four
pages, of the twenty-four resolutions that the Convention
referred to the Committee. The Convention was sensitive about
not permitting copies to be made of its resolutions. Early in the
proceedings it resolved that no copies be taken “without leave of
the House” (and in fact on July 25 refused permission to Luther
49
Martin to make a copy). Wilson’s text of the resolutions and the
version in Madison’s Notes are the only two copies known to
have survived. (I note in passing that the Wilson archive contains
a second list of Convention resolutions, dating from earlier in the
summer, and presumably made for his own use; that he was
permitted to take them perhaps indicates something of his
standing within the Convention.)
On six smaller pages, bound together into a signature,
Wilson has listed twenty-five provisions that McLaughlin and
Farrand identified as coming from the Pinckney Plan. There are
a couple of other, smaller and relatively insignificant sheets, and
a half-folio page, written on both sides, containing extracts from
the New Jersey and the Pinckney plans.
The most important documents are two drafts of the
Constitution. Both are written on folio sheets that have been
folded to make four-page signatures. The first draft, which
originally consisted of three signatures, is missing its middle
signature; the last is nearly identical to the final report of the
Committee.
It is important to stress just how little we know about the
internal workings of the Committee. We do not know exactly

49. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 17 (May 29); 2 CONVENTION
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 107 (July 25).
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how the Convention viewed their charge—whether they were
expected simply to write up the existing resolutions, or expected
also to add substantive provisions. The few scraps of
information—e.g., Washington’s diary entry mentioned above—
50
point to the first interpretation, but are inconclusive. Nor can
much be inferred from the name, “Committee of Detail”: to call
something a detail is not necessarily to say it is unimportant. We
do not know where the Committee met, or when, or how often;
we do not know whether there were heated internal debates, nor
how they would have been resolved. It is certain that some
Wilson documents have gone missing; and if Rutledge or
Ellsworth or Gorham kept notes or records, they have not
survived.
Two of the surviving documents—the Randolph draft and
the final Wilson draft—contain extensive annotations by
Rutledge; numerous provisions have also been checked off, both
here and in the earlier Wilson draft. Many historians have
inferred that the check marks are Rutledge’s: that he presided
over the meetings and made the insertions as the Committee
discussed the successive drafts. But other papers in the Wilson
archive bear similar check-marks. They are most likely his, and
51
not Rutledge’s.
At this stage, a warning is in season. It is important not to
leap from these facts to a tempting and obvious conclusion.
Almost all of the early drafts of the Constitution are in Wilson’s
hand. Even the Randolph draft contains Wilson’s check marks.
He was a powerful member of the Convention, a skilled
legislative draftsman, and possessed remarkable energy. Many
historians have inferred that he must have utterly dominated the
proceedings: in Brant’s phrase, that it was a Committee of
“Wilson and four others.” But that is too hasty. In the first place,
from the fact that most of the surviving documents are in
Wilson’s hand, nothing whatsoever can be inferred; and indeed,
many provisions that he strongly and consistently opposed
appear for the first time in his drafts. It was Rutledge, not
50. Supra note 15. Or again, the delegate Hugh Williamson wrote to James Iredell
on July 22 that “After much labor the Convention have nearly agreed on the principles
and outlines of a system, which we hope may fairly be called an amendment of the
Federal Government. This system we expect will, in three or four days, be referred to a
small committee, to be properly dressed . . . .” 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at
61.
51. I owe this observation to Lorianne Updike Toler. The most reasonable
conjecture is that the check marks were made by Wilson in the course of writing up the
next draft: he would have wished to be sure that all of Randolph’s points were included.
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Wilson, who ultimately presented the Committee’s report to the
Convention; and as we shall see, on many issues, Wilson, far
from being dominant, appears to have been outflanked by
Rutledge and the others. But there is a further point. Anybody
who has attempted to work with the manuscripts quickly comes
to recognize Randolph’s legible but uneven scrawl, and to dread
the wild and idiosyncratic jottings of Rutledge. Wilson, in contrast, displays excellent penmanship. He wrote an elegant
cursive: quite possibly for this reason he was chosen as the
Committee amanuensis.
The issues here are complex and require careful analysis. In
particular, it is necessary to try to reconstruct, so far as is
possible, the exact sequence of the internal workings of the
52
Committee. That involves, as a first step, closely inspecting the
various documents, placing them in chronological order, and
observing which provisions were added at which stage. One then
wants to try to reconstruct who is likely to have been responsible
for which provisions and that involves careful crosschecking. The
basic principles are as follows. (1) If Madison’s Notes show that,
on the floor of the Convention, a provision was opposed by one
of the Committeemen, either before or after the Committee did
its work, that is good prima facie evidence that the provision was
the handiwork of somebody else: mutatis mutandis if the
Committee member spoke in favor of the provision. It should be
emphasized that this evidence is only prima facie: delegates must
often have made arguments, not on their own initative, but in
support of an ally, or from some other tactical calculation. It
should also be emphasized that our evidence is extremely
incomplete and that one cannot always confidently infer from
what Madison reports as having been said on the floor to what a
member did in Committee; but the more frequent and more
emphatic the declarations on the floor, the more confidence we
are entitled to place in the inference. (2) One needs also to make
use of whatever is known about the general biographical
backgrounds of the Committee members, about their general
political views, and about the views of their state delegations; but
in the nature of things, that evidence is less probative than
52. It is odd that the task has apparently not been attempted in a sustained manner
before. Exemplary in this regard is CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE
PRESIDENCY, 1775–1789: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 94–104 (1922).
Although Thach’s discussion is confined to the executive branch, he clearly understands
the methodological issues, and he devotes ten insightful pages to the Committee of
Detail. He is careful in his inferences, and careful, too, to try to establish the individual
views of the Committee members as expressed on the floor of the Convention.
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evidence from the Convention itself. (One thinks of Madison,
whose views shifted dramatically over the years.) (3) It is of
course necessary to pay close attention to the materials formally
entrusted to the Committee by the Convention—viz., the
Convention resolutions and the New Jersey and Pinckney plans.
But one must also consider other documents which they had at
their disposal and of which they certainly made use—notably the
Articles of Confederation, but also the Constitutions of the
states (especially New York, Massachusetts, and Virginia). Much
of the specific language of the Committee Report was taken
from these sources.
Let us now examine the documents and attempt to
reconstruct, so far as is possible, the sequence of events within
the Committee.
B. DOCUMENTS I, II, AND III
I begin with a terminological point. Jameson and Farrand
confronted a number of scattered pieces of paper relating to the
Committee of Detail. They were able to work out the
chronological sequence: as we shall see, the internal evidence is
compelling. In the Records, Farrand arranged this material into a
sequence of documents, which he numbered I through IX. Not
all of these documents can be regarded as a “draft of the
Constitution”—that is, as a fully articulated scheme of national
government. I shall therefore speak of the nine documents,
reserving the term draft for the more substantial items in the list.
About Document I there is not much to say. It is a list,
entirely in Wilson’s handwriting, of the resolutions of the
Convention up to July 23. The content is no surprise: a threebranch national government, with a bicameral legislature in
whose second chamber each state shall have two votes, with its
lower chamber elected in proportion to population, and with a
broad grant of national legislative power.
Farrand supplemented Wilson’s list with his own brief
Document II, which lists the Convention resolutions taken on
July 24-26, i.e. between the appointment of the Committee and
its first meeting.
Document III is the longer of Wilson’s two sets of extracts
from the Pinckney Plan and was discovered by Andrew
53
McLaughlin. Farrand doubtless placed it at this point in the
53. Note, supra note 24.

!!!EWALD-282-THECOMMITTEEOFDETAILACCEPTED.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

12/13/2012 2:08 PM

220

[Vol. 28:197

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

sequence because he knew that the Pinckney Plan, submitted to
the Convention on May 29 and promptly tabled, had been
referred to the Committee. However, that original document
would have been in Pinckney’s handwriting, not in Wilson’s; and
it is not even clear that this particular set of extracts belongs to
the work of the Committee of Detail. It is physically different
from the other Wilson manuscripts: a small, bound signature,
whereas the other documents are written on folio sheets. It is
entirely possible that this Document was made at some other
time, possibly as early as mid-May, when Pinckney was
54
attempting to interest other delegates in his scheme. The
Pinckney Plan, in any case, raises subtle issues that I shall
postpone to another occasion.
C. DRAFT IV
1. Overview
The next document—Farrand’s Document IV—is con55
siderably longer. It has a good claim to be the first draft of the
Constitution, stricto sensu. It is almost entirely in the hand of
Edmund Randolph, with annotations by John Rutledge.
As I noted earlier, the committee—Gorham (Massachusetts),
Ellsworth (Connecticut), Wilson (Pennsylvania), Randolph
(Virginia), and Rutledge (South Carolina)—was evidently
chosen with an eye to geographical balance. Why was Randolph
selected from Virginia, and not Madison? A number of factors
no doubt played a part. In the first place, Randolph was a
Randolph of Virginia, at the time probably the most socially
prominent family in the nation. (Jefferson’s own aristocratic
pedigree came through his mother’s connection to the
Randolphs: not through the Jefferson line). He was, in addition,
the Governor of the largest and most influential state in the
Union; he was an eminent lawyer; and he had formally presented
the Virginia Plan to the Convention. Indeed, the other delegates,
who frequently referred to “Mr. Randolph’s plan,” may well
have assumed that Randolph (rather than the more junior
Madison) was the author: a point on which Madison appears to
56
have been sensitive in his later years. But regardless of what the
54. See, e.g., 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 25 (May 21) and 39 (June
10) for indications that Pinckney was circulating his plan.
55. Transcribed at COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, 263–85.
56. Madison, as he revised his Notes for publication, took pains to ward off such a
misunderstanding and explicitly pointed out that he had conveyed to Randolph before
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delegates thought, in terms of parliamentary procedure the
assignment of the Committee of Detail was to revise the plan
Randolph had submitted on May 29, as modified first by the
Committee of the Whole and then by the Convention. (The
delegates were sensitive to these parliamentary distinctions, and
when the Committee of the Whole formally reported to the
Convention, or the Convention committed matters to the
Committee, it was always made clear that the discussion referred
57
to the “plan of Mr. Randolph.” ) These facts are adequate to
explain his presence on the Committee; and with Randolph of
Virginia on, Madison of Virginia was necessarily off.
There can be no doubt that Document IV dates to late July,
for it incorporates the “Connecticut compromise” of July
sixteenth. Randolph had vehemently and repeatedly opposed
that result. We can therefore conclude that the document is not a
private record of his own constitutional preferences. It is also
easily seen to antedate the various Wilson drafts, which
incorporate verbatim numerous items from the Randolph
document, but then go on to add further provisions. For all these
reasons, Document IV can be confidently assigned to the time
either just before or just after the Committee began to meet.
Whether it should be viewed as a product of the deliberations of
the Committee is a more difficult question which I shall discuss
in due course.
2. Randolph and Mason
I mentioned that the document itself was discovered among
58
the papers of George Mason. How Randolph’s draft of the
Constitution came to be located in Mason’s papers is unknown.
But Randolph and Mason had a great deal in common. Both
were descendants of aristocratic Virginia families. Although
Randolph was nearly thirty years younger than Mason, they had
known each other and worked together since the early days of
the Revolution. Beyond that, at the end of the Convention they
were to be the two great “recusants” from Virginia. They refused
the Convention the central ideas of the Virginia Plan. See 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 383 (April 16, 1787) (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975) [hereinafter
MADISON PAPERS].
57. For representative instances, see 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 238
(June 13), 240 (June 14), 242 (June 15), 249 (June 16), 282 (June 18) and 322 (June 19).
58. I note in passing that although George Bancroft consulted papers that were in
the hands of George Mason’s son, he does not appear to have seen the Mason papers in
Philadelphia that contained the Randolph manuscript; at any rate, that manuscript is not
mentioned anywhere in BANCROFT, supra note 19.
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to sign the Constitution and in the process nearly scuttled its
ratification—a fact that severely (and, in the case of Mason,
59
irreparably) strained their relations with Washington. The
trajectory of their relationship is complex. At the time of the
refusal to sign—i.e., in the last days of the Convention—they
were close allies; and it is a reasonable conjecture that this is the
moment at which Randolph shared his draft with Mason,
possibly in preparation for the ratification debates. But when
Randolph some weeks later decided after all to support
ratification, Mason felt betrayed and began to refer to Randolph
60
as “young A----d” (i.e. “Arnold”). Randolph’s History of
Virginia, written around 1808 after Mason’s death, was more
61
generous to the older man. But beyond all these facts there is a
further deep appropriateness that the first draft of the
Constitution should have found its way into the papers of
George Mason—and also a certain deep irony.
To understand this document, it is important to begin by
considering the way in which the project of drafting a
Constitution would have presented itself to the members of the
Committee. The basic structure of American constitutions in fact
goes back to the work of George Mason eleven years earlier. On
May 10, 1776 the Continental Congress instructed the colonies to
organize new governments. On May 15, probably before
knowing of this vote, the Virginia Convention appointed a
committee to draft a bill of rights and a constitution. The committee was large, unwieldy, and, as Mason said, “over-charged
62
with useless members.” Partly to expedite matters and partly to
63
ward off the “thousand ridiculous and impracticable proposals”
he expected it to produce, he went to work on his own. He must
have worked with astonishing speed. We do not know exactly
when he finished. But on May 27—just eight days after his

59. For a thorough account of their activities during the ratification debates, see
PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788,
at 216, 242, 318–19 (2010). Washington attributed Mason’s recusal to “pride . . . and . . .
want of manly candor” (Washington to James Craik, Sept. 8, 1789), and shortly before
Mason’s death referred to him as “my neighbor and quondam friend” (Washington to
Hamilton, July 29, 1792).
60. ROBERT A. RUTLAND, GEORGE MASON, RELUCTANT STATESMAN 103 (1961).
61. EDMUND RANDOLPH, THE HISTORY OF VIRGINIA 255 (reprinted in 1970)
(1808).
62. 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 271–72 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970)
[hereinafter MASON PAPERS] (transcribing a letter sent by George Mason to Richard
Henry Lee). The most thorough general biography of Mason is JEFF BROADWATER,
GEORGE MASON, FORGOTTEN FOUNDER (2006).
63. 1 MASON PAPERS, supra note 62, at 271.
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appointment to the Committee—his draft had been debated by
the Committee, modified, voted upon, and referred back to the
full Convention. The Committee report on a Declaration of
Rights was published in the Virginia newspapers on June 1 and
appeared in Philadelphia on June 6: that is, less than a month
64
after the initial vote of Congress.
Meanwhile, Mason turned his attention to the Virginia
Constitution. He presented a draft to the Committee by June 10;
after some debate, a revised version was ordered to be printed,
and was formally reported to the Convention on the 24th.
(Mason’s drafts have been lost, so it is not known how
extensively the Committee revised his original scheme.) By July
4, 1776, his work had been widely distributed throughout the
United States; and it provided the pattern for most of the state
65
constitutions that were to follow. Mason’s work during these
few weeks was one of the most remarkable episodes of the
Revolution, fully comparable in importance to Jefferson’s
simultaneous writing of the Declaration of Independence, and at
66
least as influential.
Within a few years, all American states had enacted constitutions of their own. Most followed Mason’s structure: first, a
lengthy declaration of rights (usually copied more or less directly
from Mason); this was followed by what was typically called a
67
frame of government. The frame of government was invariably
organized into a four-part sequence: legislature, executive,
judiciary, and miscellaneous provisions. The nomenclature is not
constant. Sometimes, the word “constitution” is employed to

64. Id. at 274–91.
65. The surviving drafts of the Virginia Constitution and careful editorial
commentary are provided in id. at 295–310. Both Madison and Jefferson, by the middle
1780s, were critical of the Virginia Constitution for its inequality in representation, for its
property qualification for voting rights, and for its clumsy executive council. Id. at 310.
66. It should be remembered—as emphasized in PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN
SCRIPTURE 160–70 (1997)—that Jefferson’s Declaration did not achieve its iconic status
until decades later, after Jefferson had grown into the towering figure of early
nineteenth-century politics: originally, the Fourth of July was celebrated to
commemorate the fact of separation from Britain rather than the document. For the first
decades after Independence, Mason’s work, and particularly his Bill of Rights, was
considerably more influential than Jefferson’s Declaration; it was to provide the pattern
for all subsequent bills of rights, both domestically and overseas, and notably for the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.
67. The most convenient source for the early state constitutions is unfortunately
still the collection edited by Francis Newton Thorpe. A new edition is badly needed. THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909).
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designate both the declaration (or “bill”) of rights and the frame
(or “form”) of government; but sometimes it is used to designate
the frame alone. Some of the early 1776 constitutions
incorporate a list of grievances, more or less copied from the
Declaration of Independence, against the King; most do not.
Sometimes (as in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780), the
bill of rights is further subdivided into a “preamble” and a
“declaration”; sometimes (as in New York) a bill of rights is
omitted altogether.
3. Randolph’s Background
I shall return to these facts and to George Mason later: they
turn out to be important for understanding the Randolph draft.
For now, it is important to understand something of the
68
personality of Edmund Randolph. He was descended from the
most prominent family in Virginia; his father and greatgrandfather were both distinguished lawyers; his uncle and
grandfather both served in the colonial government as Attorney
General. On the outbreak of revolution, his father remained
loyal to the crown and ultimately took sail for England; his
uncle, in contrast, became a leader of the revolutionary forces.
Edmund cast his lot with his uncle. In the years leading up to
1787 he had held a variety of positions: aide-de-camp to George
Washington, a member of the Continental Congress, a member
of the Virginia legislature, Attorney General of Virginia, and
(from November, 1786) Governor. He had established himself as
one of the most prominent lawyers in Virginia, with a thriving
practice and with experience in litigating cases of public
significance. Unlike most Virginia aristocrats, he was a lawyer
rather than a planter, and had little personal stake in the
institution of slavery. Like the rest of the Virginia delegation, he
appears to have assumed and hoped that slavery would
69
eventually wither away. He was one of the principal organizers
of the Annapolis conference and instrumental in persuading
Washington to attend the Philadelphia convention. He was
clearly a man of great intelligence and practical experience. But,
unlike Madison, Hamilton, or Wilson, he displays little interest
in abstract questions of political philosophy. He also changed his
mind often during the convention, and it is this fact which makes

68. See generally JOHN J. REARDON, EDMUND RANDOLPH: A BIOGRAPHY (1974).
69. This matter is discussed infra note 155 and accompanying text.
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it especially difficult to work out his precise views during the
Committee of Detail.
For the first weeks of the summer, as the Convention
debated what he no doubt thought of as the Randolph proposals,
he appears to have been an enthusiastic if somewhat dogmatic
participant, occasionally intervening with warnings against the
excesses of democracy and “the demagogues of the popular
70
branch.” He was hostile to Wilson’s idea of a single executive,
71
calling it “the foetus of monarchy.” During the “great debate”
he was adamantly on the side of Madison and Wilson. But after
the defeat of July 16, his mood appears to have soured, and over
the remainder of the summer his remarks (if Madison’s Notes
72
accurately capture their spirit) grew increasingly cantankerous.
By August 29 he was saying “that there were features so odious
in the Constitution as it now stands, that he doubted whether he
73
should be able to agree to it.”
Such remarks set his new tone. From this point forward, he
routinely threatened to vote against the document, curtly
declared his “inflexible” opposition; and, having already
denounced democracy, now expressed his fear that the
74
Constitution was tending towards monarchy and aristocracy.
And in the end, of course, he did refuse to sign the Constitution.
But then he exhibited another aspect of his personality. Did
his refusal to sign mean that he would oppose ratification? Not
at all, he assured the Convention. He “did not mean by this
refusal to decide that he should oppose the Constitution without
doors. He meant only to keep himself free to be governed by his
75
duty as it should be prescribed by his future judgment.” After
further reflection, he changed his mind again, and supported the
70. Randolph made remarks of this tenor on May 29, May 31, and June 12; his
remarks about democracy occur in in 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 26–27
and 51; the remark about “demagogues” occurs in id. at 218.
71. Id. at 65–66 (June 1).
72. In the immediate aftermath of the vote of July 16, having found his own
suggestions for a compromise rejected, he said “he wished the Convention might
adjourn, that the large States might consider the steps proper to be taken in the present
solemn crisis of the business . . . .” 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 18 (July
16). Challenged and asked whether he meant an adjournment sine die, he retreated and
said he only meant for the rest of the day. Id.; see also REARDON, supra note 68, at 101–
36 (providing copious documentation of Randolph’s growing irritability).
73. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 452 (August 29). Randolph was
speaking in support of Charles Pinckney who had moved for a two-thirds supermajority
for all laws regulating commerce; in Randolph’s eyes, “[a] rejection of the [Pinckney]
motion would compleat [sic] the deformity of the system.” Id.
74. Id. at 513 (September 5).
75. Id. at 645 (September 17).
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Constitution during the ratification debates. Randolph, in other
words, for all his brilliance, was highly unpredictable: and his
contemporaries noticed. His cousin, John Randolph of Roanoke,
described him as “the chameleon on the aspen, always
76
trembling, always changing.” For these reasons, despite his
presentation of the Virginia plan, he has generally been ranked
by historians as one of the more disappointing delegates to the
Convention, an erratic figure who made few original
contributions. But a close inspection of his work on the
Committee of Detail tells a different story.
4. The Randolph Draft
Let us now turn to the text of Document IV itself.
Randolph’s draft is long (nine pages in manuscript, filling twelve
pages in Farrand’s printed transcription—far longer than the
three printed pages of Convention Resolutions). He incorporates the substance of the Resolutions, but adds many new
items that had not previously been discussed. It would be tedious
and not especially helpful to compile a detailed list; the main
points can be summarized as follows.
The bulk of his additions can be classified as “minor
matters”—that is, items that needed to be stipulated in a
completed Constitution, but that did not demand the attention
of the assembled delegates and that were unlikely to provoke
prolonged discussion. Examples are: the privilege of members of
the legislature from arrest; the manner of filling legislative
vacancies; the rules for quorums and adjournments; the use of
the terminology (taken from the Virginia Constitution) “House
of Delegates” and “Senate.” Most of these provisions were
drawn either from the Articles of Confederation or from the
state constitutions. (Randolph explicitly mentions his use of the
Constitution of New York; but the influence of the constitutions
77
of Massachusetts and Virginia is also evident. ) There are also a
76. 2 WILLIAM CABELL BRUCE, JOHN RANDOLPH OF ROANOKE 202 (reprint 1970)
(1922). Precisely these personality traits were to lead to Randolph’s eventual disgrace at
the time of the Jay Treaty; the well-known story is told by STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 424–31 (1993). They describe Washington’s fury,
and quote Madison’s remark that even Randolph’s “best friends can’t save him from the
self-condemnation of his political career as explained by himself.” Id. at 431. Knowledge
of these dramatic later events may have colored historians’ views of Randolph at the
Convention.
77. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 139; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 267 (cancelled reference to “the 16th. article of the New York
constitution”). Madison decades later noted the influence of the Virginia Constitution; 3
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few changes to the Convention resolutions that probably
78
represent unintended slips. Nobody is likely to have objected to
these minor contributions: this was a job the Committee was
expected to perform. And it may be that the Convention
delegates expected the Committee to go no further.
Other matters, however, are more problematic. To facilitate
comparisons between drafts, I shall arrange the discussion into
the standard sequence: legislature, executive, judiciary, and
miscellaneous.
a. The Legislature
1) Property Qualifications
On the last day before its recess, the Convention debated
the question of property qualifications for members of the
79
national government. Wilson on principle opposed restrictions
80
of this sort; but he spoke only briefly. Two other members of
the Committee—Gorham and Ellsworth—favored leaving the
question to the legislature. The discussion filled most of the day;
in the end, the Convention ordered the Committee to require
“certain qualifications of property” for members of the national
81
legislature, executive, and judiciary. Randolph (who approved
of such restrictions) evidently struggled with this charge. He

CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 528.
78. For instance, Randolph’s draft gives the minimum age for senators as 25.
COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 269. The Convention resolutions had
specified 25 as the minimum age for representatives and 30 for senators. This was
entirely in keeping with Randolph’s view of the more august nature of the Senate, and
the error was rectified in subsequent drafts.
79. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 120–25 (July 26). The provision
appears in Randolph’s draft. Id. at 139–40. Randolph did not speak to the issue in the
Convention debate. But property qualifications for legislators are found in most of the
contemporary state constitutions, and were evidently favored by the Convention;
Randolph’s remarks on the nature of the Senate (as expressed especially on May 31, but
also on May 29 and June 12) leave little doubt that he would have voted in favor of
George Mason’s motion.
80. Thus, for example, he declared himself against age restrictions, stating that he
“was agst. abridging the rights of election in any shape. It was the same thing whether
this were done by disqualifying the objects of choice, or the persons chusing [sic].” 1
CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 375 (June 22). I infer from the vote of the
Pennsylvania delegation that Wilson voted against Mason’s motion for property
requirements. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 121–25 (July 26).
81. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 134. The measure passed by a vote
of 10-1. Id. at 124. It read (as amended): “Resolved That it be an instruction to the
Committee . . . to receive a clause or clauses, requiring certain qualifications of property
and citizenship in the United States for the Executive, the Judiciary, and the Members of
both branches of the Legislature of the United States.” Id. at 134.
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listed a number of possible restrictions on electors, which he
82
then crossed out; added a property qualification for Senators,
but without attempting to specify an exact amount; and omitted
to include any qualification for the executive or judiciary.
2) Senatorial Dominance
More importantly, the Draft reflects a conception of a
powerful Senate. This is in keeping with the vision of Madison
and of the Virginia Plan; and in the aftermath of the
“Connecticut compromise” of July 16, this was something which
the small-state delegates could now support. The Randolph
Draft in particular gives to the Senate the power to make
treaties of commerce, peace, and alliance; to appoint
83
ambassadors; and to appoint the judiciary. Only the last of
these powers had previously been voted upon by the
84
Convention. The addition of the powers over foreign affairs is
new and appears to be Randolph’s own interpolation: clearly, he
is no longer following the script. Wilson in particular would have
disagreed with giving the Senate these powers, which he
85
repeatedly argued should be exercised by the President.
(Indeed, even months later, in the Pennsylvania ratification
convention, he noted that he was “not a blind admirer of this
system”—and indicated in particular that he objected to the
Senate’s appointment and treaty powers. However, he consoled
himself that, because those powers were now shared with the
82. For electors, Randolph listed several possible restrictions: citizenship, manhood,
sanity of mind, residency in the state for one year, service in the militia, as well as
possession of real property—these items are then crossed out. Id. at 139–40; COMMITTEE
DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 269. In the margin, Rutledge has written, “These
qualifications not justified by the resolutions.” (Rutledge is correct: the resolutions dealt
with qualifications for national office, not with qualifications for electors.) Rutledge’s
own comment has then been cancelled.
83. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 144–45; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 277. The power to send ambassadors has been added in Rutledge’s
hand.
84. See 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 119–20 (June 5) and 232–33
(June 13) (describing the debates and votes on the appointment of the judiciary). The
Convention resolutions provided for the Senate to appoint the justices of the Supreme
Court, and for the national legislature to “appoint inferior Tribunals.” “Appoint” here is
ambiguous, and may merely mean “create”; this would be in accordance with the actual
vote of June 5. See 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 125–26 (June 5). In any
case, the resolutions made no explicit provision for the specifically Senatorial
appointment of lower federal judges. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 132;
COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 245–47.
85. Wilson expressed his views repeatedly at the Convention, both before and after
the meetings of the Committee of Detail. See, e.g., 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
2, at 119 (June 5); 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 538 (September 7).

!!!EWALD-282-THECOMMITTEEOFDETAILACCEPTED.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

12/13/2012 2:08 PM

THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL

229

President, the Senate “can only show its teeth, it is unable to bite
86
or devour.” )
3) Enumeration of Powers
The Randolph Draft also introduced an enumeration of
87
eighteen specific powers of the national legislature. The
Convention had at various points discussed the desirability of an
enumeration, but had not itself drawn up any such list. Instead, it
adopted a resolution which reached the Committee of Detail in
the following language:
Resolved That the Legislature of the United States ought to
possess the legislative Rights vested in Congress by the
Confederation; and moreover to legislate in all Cases for the
general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to
which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the
Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the
88
Exercise of individual Legislation.

The language of this resolution does not itself settle the question
of whether there was to be an enumeration. The issue is highly
complex; it needs to be considered in conjunction with the
Necessary and Proper Clause, and I shall return to it when
discussing Document IX.
The majority of the enumerated powers appear in
Randolph’s handwriting: the power to tax, and to regulate
commerce; to make war and equip armies; to provide tribunals
for offenses against the laws of nations; to declare the law of
piracy; to establish post offices; to declare the law of treason; to
regulate the state militias; to regulate naturalization. In the
margins, Rutledge has added some further powers: over Indian
affairs; the power to regulate weights and measures; to borrow
money; to enforce treaties.
Where did the enumerated powers come from? Most were
drawn from the enumeration in the Articles of Confederation.
Randolph furthermore made explicit the powers to tax, to
regulate commerce, and to raise an army and navy. But the
addition of these powers would not have been controversial;

86. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 162.
87. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 142–44; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 273.
88. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 131–32; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 245. This language had been adopted by the Convention on July 17. 2
CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 21.
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indeed, they were virtually the raison d’être of the Convention.
The power to regulate naturalization appears to be his own
contribution.
Ironically, although it appears to have been Randolph who
first produced the enumeration of powers, and although the
Convention in essence adopted his handiwork, he was in the end
to list the “indefinite and dangerous power given by the
Constitution to Congress” as one of his principal reasons for
89
refusing to sign. I shall come back to the point later.
4) The “Deep South” Provisions
Most strikingly, Document IV, as part of its enumeration of
powers, inserted three provisions entirely for the benefit of the
90
South, and especially the deep South. These provisions were to
cause considerable controversy when they were debated in
August; and they had not been discussed in Convention before
the meeting of the Committee of Detail. How were they
introduced and by whom?
Here it is helpful to have a sense of the physical appearance
of the manuscript. It consists of nine pages, written on five
physical sheets. The first eight pages are written on the recto and
91
verso sides; the final page on the recto side of a sheet of its own.
On the first four pages there are three or four slight
interventions in the hand of Rutledge. Then, on page five, when
the powers of Congress are enumerated, and for two pages
thereafter, his interventions are frequent and conspicuous; and
the “deep South” passages are among those Rutledge most
heavily edited.
From the fact that he presented the final report to the
Convention and that his annotations are found on several of the

89. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 631 (September 15). Randolph’s
other major comments on enumeration occur at 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2,
at 53; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 26, 488–89, 563–64. I note that his
September 15 opposition is likely not to the enumeration of powers itself, but to the
Necessary and Proper Clause, which he opposed. Id. at 563 (September 10) (“Mr.
Randolph took this opportunity to state his objections to the System. They turned . . . on
the general clause concerning necessary and proper laws . . . .”). See infra text
accompanying notes 175–207.
90. These controversial provisions occur on Randolph’s fifth sheet. 2 CONVENTION
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 143; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 273.
91. The pages have been numbered in pencil at the top of the page, presumably by
an archivist at the Library of Congress. As discussed below (infra note 127 and
accompanying text), the final sheet could arguably also be assigned to the beginning; but
this subtlety is irrelevant to the present discussion.

!!!EWALD-282-THECOMMITTEEOFDETAILACCEPTED.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL

12/13/2012 2:08 PM

231

drafts, Rutledge is generally assumed to have been the chairman
of the committee and to have presided over its sessions. It is also
generally assumed (no doubt correctly) that he was centrally
involved in the “deep South” passages. He was himself a considerable slaveowner and vigorously defended the interests of
the slave states in the Convention debates; moreover, as the
Committee member from South Carolina, he undoubtedly
reminded his colleagues that General Pinckney had threatened
to vote against any report that did not protect slavery. From
these various facts it has often been concluded that Rutledge
dominated the proceedings and even that he “hijacked the
92
Constitution.” But the documents tell a more complex story.
Document IV contains three “deep South” provisions. The
first prohibits Congress from taxing exports. This clause appears
in Randolph’s hand, immediately after the clause granting
Congress the power to tax. Next to this restriction, Rutledge has
written “agrd.”; but whether the agreeing was by Rutledge or by
the full Committee is impossible to say. This issue had received
93
little attention in the opening weeks of the Convention. But on
July 12 General Pinckney argued that, if South Carolina’s slaves
were not to count fully towards representation in Congress, then
94
the fruits of their labor—i.e. exports—should not be taxed; and
when the Committee of Detail was appointed he bluntly
announced that he would vote against any report that did not
95
prohibit such taxes. The delegations from the deep South were
solidly on his side; Virginia was split, with Madison opposing
96
him, and Mason in favor. Randolph appears to have agreed (or
at least to have thought it necessary to accommodate him); and a
few lines below “No taxes on exports,” he repeats the point and
writes, “no Duty on exports.” Rutledge then inserts a further
prohibition: “no State to lay a duty on imports.” This, too, would
prevent the northern states from imposing a duty on southern
goods.
Secondly, Randolph added a further provision that had so
far not even been mentioned: a requirement that any navigation
92. See STEWART, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
93. I note in passing that both Hamilton and Gouverneur Morris appear to have
assumed that export taxes would be permitted. See 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
2, at 286, 592.
94. Id. at 592 (July 12).
95. Supra note 14 and accompanying text.
96. For the deep South, see 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 307 (giving
the views of Hugh Williamson); see also id. at 374 (giving the views of Pierce Butler); id.
at 306–07 (giving the views of Madison); id. at 305–06 (giving the views of Mason).
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act (i.e., any act regulating imports and exports) be passed by a
supermajority of each chamber of the legislature. The evident
fear was that the northern states (who dominated the shipping
industry) would use navigation acts to the disadvantage of
southern exporters: the supermajority requirement would ward
97
off that particular threat. This navigation act provision appears
to have been a particular hobbyhorse of Randolph’s. At any
rate, as late as August 29—even after the delegation from South
Carolina had thrown in the towel—he was still hotly arguing the
98
point. Wilson, in contrast, explicitly opposed this supermajority
requirement, as he opposed supermajority requirements
99
generally. Indeed, in this one instance Rutledge intervenes
100
actually to reduce Randolph’s supermajority requirement. We
may infer that Randolph introduced it into the draft on his own
initiative.
The third provision, connected to the other two, was brief.
In his original formulation, Randolph had written, “no
prohibitions on Importations of inhabitants. no duties by way of
such prohibition.” This was of course a veiled reference to the
slave trade. Rutledge intervened to make the prohibition more
explicit, interlineating and changing the first clause as follows:
“no prohibition on such ^ye^ Importations of ^such^
inhabitants ^or People as the sevl. States think proper to
101
This provision, too, had not previously been
admit^.”
discussed in the Convention, and was a major concession to the
interests of the deep South. It also raises a perplexing question
about Randolph. When, on August 22, a version of the slave
clause he himself had drafted was debated in Convention,
Randolph actually opposed it, and sought a compromise:
He dwelt on the dilemma to which the Convention was
exposed. By agreeing to the clause, it would revolt the
Quakers, the Methodists, and many others in the States
having no slaves. On the other hand, two States [i.e. South
102
Carolina and Georgia] might be lost to the Union.

97. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 449–52.
98. See id. at 452–53 (“Mr. Randolph said that there were features so odious in the
Constitution as it now stands, that he doubted whether he should be able to agree to it.”).
99. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 451.
100. Randolph had originally required an affirmative vote of 11 states; Rutledge
changed this to two-thirds.
101. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 143; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 273. (The words between carats are interlineations in Rutledge’s hand.)
102. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 374.

!!!EWALD-282-THECOMMITTEEOFDETAILACCEPTED.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL

12/13/2012 2:08 PM

233

Not himself a plantation owner, he had no great personal stake
in the survival of slavery; and this makes it somewhat curious
that the slavery provision should first arise in his handwriting.
Perhaps, in the wake of subsequent controversy, he revised his
position; or perhaps he originally inserted the provision in
response to pressure from the South Carolinians. We do not
know.
I shall return later to these three “deep South” provisions
and their implications for the internal dynamics of the
Committee. For now, I merely note that the principal elements
all make their first appearance in the handwriting of Randolph;
and that, although Rutledge intervened to adjust the language,
he did not greatly alter the substance.
So far, we have seen that Document IV, far from simply
“tidying up” the work of the Convention, has introduced several
far-reaching changes to the powers of the legislature. Contrary
to the view that Rutledge “hijacked the Constitution,” the proslavery provisions make their first appearance in the handwriting
of Randolph. And, contrary to the view that Wilson dominated
the proceedings, none of the changes so far can be ascribed to
his agency.
There is here a more general question. Is the initial
Randolph draft his own handiwork or the product of Committee
debate? Are the Rutledge annotations to be interpreted as the
views of Rutledge or were they added in the course of
Committee discussions? I shall return to these questions after we
have proceeded through the entire document; for now, I merely
note the importance of not leaping from the handwriting to
conclusions about ultimate authorship.
b. The Executive
The treatment of the presidency in the Randolph draft is
103
subtle and requires close attention. We can begin by noticing
the views of the committee members as expressed in the general
debates. Both Randolph and Rutledge were hostile to a strong
executive. Although Rutledge supported Wilson’s proposal for a
single executive, he did not wish the president to appoint
members of the judiciary, and he vigorously argued that he be
104
elected by the legislature. Randolph was even more skeptical,
103. I have been helped here by the superb study, THACH, supra note 52, at 105–39,
which devotes its fifth chapter principally to the Committee of Detail.
104. See 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 65 (June 1) (supporting Wilson
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wishing to limit the executive to a single term, and denouncing
105
Wilson’s single executive as “the foetus of monarchy.” (He
preferred a three-member executive.) Gorham is somewhat
opaque. He did not speak often enough on the topic for his
views to be ascertained; but he, too, favored senatorial rather
106
Finally,
than presidential appointment of the judiciary.
Ellsworth supported the selection of the president by an
electoral college (rendering him independent of the legislature);
but he, like the other four, favored senatorial appointment of the
107
judiciary. Thus on the topic of the executive Wilson was
isolated.
The treatment of the executive in Document IV cannot be
considered independently of the treatment of the Senate.
Roughly speaking, in the Convention at this stage of the
proceedings there were two primary conceptions of executive
authority, which we can call the senatorial and the presidential.
On the first conception, the senate would wield many
traditionally executive functions: appointing ambassadors;
appointing judges and other officers; negotiating and ratifying
treaties; and (somewhat like the Senate in ancient Rome)
providing extensive advice (which the President, being elected
by the legislature, would be hard pressed to reject). The
presidential conception, in contrast, would lodge most of these
powers in the chief executive.
Randolph’s draft goes as far as he could go in the direction
of a senatorial presidency without actually ignoring altogether
the resolutions voted by the Convention. He introduces new
powers over treaties and ambassadors and consigns them
exclusively to the Senate; he adds no important powers to the
presidency (except the power to receive ambassadors). In
Rutledge’s handwriting are added a few points—chiefly the
pardon power, and a clearer designation of the president as
“Commander-in-Chief of the Land & Naval Forces.” And there
is one subtle matter. Rutledge’s remarks first provided that the
on single executive); id. at 119 (June 5) (opposing Wilson on appointment of judges by
the executive); 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 57 (July 19) (opposing all
modes of electing the executive except by the legislature).
105. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 66 (June 1). Randolph’s principal
other remarks on the executive are at 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 43 (July
18) (favoring appointment of judges by the Senate), and at 54–55 (July 19) (supporting
Luther Martin’s motion to limit the executive to a single term).
106. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 41 (July 18).
107. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 57 (July 19) (favoring electoral
college); id. at 81 (July 21) (favoring senatorial appointment of the judiciary).
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president be elected by a joint ballot of the legislature, which
would give the large states, with their greater representation in
the lower house, an advantage; he then changed the provision so
that each house would vote separately. What explains the
change? It is impossible to be certain; but in this instance it is
reasonable to conjecture that his insertions were made during a
Committee meeting and that the change was in response to an
objection raised (presumably by Ellsworth) on behalf of the
small states.
We do not know; but the essential point is that Rutledge
essentially leaves Randolph’s senatorial scheme intact. We shall
need to watch the sequence of drafts for alterations as they pass
through Wilson’s hands: he had a special interest in the
presidency, and this is one of the areas in which his influence on
the Committee appears to have been greatest.
c. The Judiciary
Madison’s original Virginia Plan had said little about the
national judiciary. It had provided for a supreme court and for
inferior courts; for judicial tenure during good behavior; and for
108
no reduction in salaries. These elements made their way,
slightly modified, into the Convention resolutions, and were
109
copied more-or-less verbatim by Randolph into Document IV.
The same is not true for the provisions concerning
jurisdiction of the national courts. The Virginia Plan provided
for jurisdiction over: piracies and felonies on the high seas;
“captures from an enemy”; “cases in which foreigners or citizens
of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested”;
cases involving the collection of the national revenue; impeachments of national officers; and “questions which may involve the
110
national peace and harmony.” The Convention resolutions had
been even briefer: “Resolved[.] That the Jurisdiction of the
national Judiciary shall extend to Cases arising under the Laws
passed by the general Legislature, and to such other Questions
111
as involve the national Peace and Harmony.”

108. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 20–23 (May 29).
109. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 146–47; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 279.
110. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 22 (May 29).
111. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 132–33; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 245.
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The Randolph Draft adds considerable detail. The bulk of
the passage is in Randolph’s hand. (The clauses in carats are
marginal insertions in the hand of Rutledge, to which I shall
return when discussing Draft IX. I omit the numerous check
marks in Wilson’s hand.)—
7. The jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall extend
1. to all cases, arising under laws, passed by the general;
^Legislature:^
2. to impeachments of officers: and
3. to ^such^ other cases, as the national legislature may
assign, as involving the national peace and harmony, in
the collection of the revenue, in disputes between citizens
of different states, ^in disputes between a State & a
Citizen or Citizens of another State^ in disputes between
different states; and in disputes, in which subjects or
citizens of other countries are concerned ^& in Cases of
Admiralty Jurisdn^
But this supreme jurisdiction shall be appellate only,
except in ^Cases of Impeachment & in^ those instances,
in which the legislature shall make it original. and the
legislature. shall organize it.
8. The whole or a part of the jurisdiction aforesaid. according
to the discretion of the legislature. may be assigned to the
112
inferior tribunals, as original tribunals.

Subsequent drafts added refinements; but here, for the first time,
we have a recognizable delineation of the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. In certain respects, this section is even more of an
innovation than the enumeration of legislative powers, for most
of those powers were already present in the Articles of
Confederation. But this grant of jurisdiction is a clear expansion
of the federal judicial power, going well beyond what Madison’s
Notes relate as having been discussed in Convention. The
expansion is all the more remarkable when one recalls with what
difficulty the delegates were persuaded to allow the creation of
federal courts. I note that virtually the entire passage is in
Randolph’s handwriting.
One further point is worthwhile to mention. It has a bearing
also on the enumeration of powers and the Necessary and

112. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 146–47; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 279. (I have corrected some errors of transcription in Farrand.)
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Proper Clause (to which I shall come in due course). Madison’s
Notes for June 13 show Randolph (seconded by Madison)
proposing the brief and highly general language specifying the
jurisdiction of the national courts that eventually became the
113
Convention resolution quoted above. From the account in
Madison (and from the Convention resolutions themselves) one
might conclude that this was language intended to be
incorporated into the final text of the Constitution. But the notes
of Yates for that day give a fuller account of Randolph’s (and
the Convention’s) reasoning:
Gov. Randolph observed the difficulty in establishing the
powers of the judiciary—the object however at present is to
establish this principle, to wit, the security of foreigners when
treaties are in their favor, and to preserve the harmony of
states and that of the citizens thereof. This being once
established, it will be the business of a sub-committee to detail
it; and therefore moved to obliterate such parts of the
[original Virginia] resolve so as only to establish the principle,
to wit, that the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend
to all cases of national revenue, impeachment of national
officers, and questions which involve the national peace and
114
harmony.

In other words, Randolph’s proposed language (which passed
unanimously) was explicitly put forward as a place-holder, with
the details to be filled in; and it was Randolph who did the filling
in. This major segment of the Constitution appears to be his own
handiwork.
d. Miscellaneous Provisions (and Bills of Rights)
The Randolph Draft also contains several other matters—
filling in details on the admission of new states, guaranteeing to
the states a republican form of government, specifying an
amendment process. It outlines a process for ratification of the
Constitution, and, for the first time, allowed for a less-thanunanimous ratification by the states, although it left blank the
exact number. In the main, on these points, Document IV does
what was expected, and merely fills in details, broadly in the

113. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 232.
114. Id. at 238. The Yates notes need to be handled with caution, since they were
later doctored by “Citizen Genet”; id. at xiv–xv. But other documents point in the same
direction, and I take this passage to be reliable as a report of Randolph’s reasoning. As
we shall see, this is not the only place where the language of the Convention resolutions
may have been intended to serve as a place-holder.
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spirit of the Convention resolutions and the Articles of
Confederation. There is also a more surprising marginal
insertion—this time in Rutledge’s hand, but then deleted—
providing that state laws repugnant to the Constitution were to
be treated as void, and were not to be followed by the national
115
judiciary. There are subtle matters here, regarding the way in
which these various issues were handled in the successive drafts;
but I shall leave them to one side. There is a much more
significant issue to consider.
So far, I have been discussing the portions of Randolph’s
draft that deal with what was then called “the frame of
government.” But what about the other half of the duplex
structure inherited from George Mason: a declaration of rights?
Ordinarily, such a declaration would appear at the beginning of
the document; and Randolph in fact begins Document IV with
some important remarks about constitutions in general. He
stresses the need for the Constitution to be flexible, and
therefore to contain “essential principles only, lest the
operations of government should be clogged by rendering those
provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought to be
116
accommodated to times and events[.]” This comment is
followed by the admonition “To use simple and precise
language,” and then by an important paragraph on the nature of
a preamble.
117
“A preamble,” he says, “seems proper.” But then he
immediately issues a qualification. Preambles, he says, are
115. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 144; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 277. (“All laws of a particular state, repugnant hereto, shall be void: and
in the decision therein, which shall be vested in the supreme judiciary, all incidents
without which the general principles cannot be satisfied, shall be considered, as involved
in the general principle.” Some slips in Farrand’s transcription have here been
corrected.) This was evidently an attempt to formulate the Supremacy Clause required
by the Convention resolutions. I note in passing the awkwardness of the formulation,
which is characteristic of Rutledge—and which provides at least a minor indication that
Wilson, a far better draftsman, was not involved in the Randolph draft.
116. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 137; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 265. It would be rash to attempt to claim Randolph on the basis of these
remarks as an advocate of a “living Constitution.” In the first place, his remarks explicitly
recognize the existence of “permanent and unalterable” principles. But, more
importantly, the philosophical framework of the modern debate over originalism simply
did not exist in the 18th century, and to try to squeeze Randolph into the modern
conceptual categories is to risk severe anachronism.
117. Id. Farrand has mis-transcribed this passage. It reads (all deletions and
interlineations are in Randolph’s hand):
A preamble seems proper. Not for the purpose of designating the ends of
government and human polities—This business, if not fitter for the schools, is at
least sufficiently executed display of theory, howsoever proper in the first

!!!EWALD-282-THECOMMITTEEOFDETAILACCEPTED.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

12/13/2012 2:08 PM

THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL

239

proper in the constitutions of the states for two purposes: first,
for designating the ends of government and human polities;
second, for presenting “the natural rights of man not yet
gathered into society.” But in the present Constitution such a
“display of theory” is unnecessary (“fitter for the schools” he
says in a cancelled passage). The matter has been “sufficiently
executed” in the state constitutions. We are now dealing with
men who have already entered into society, and whose rights are
118
“interwoven with . . . the rights of states.”
It is customary to speak of the opening words of the U.S.
Constitution as the “preamble.” But that is our language, not the
language of the document itself. In any case, Randolph’s
rejection of preambles is itself longer than the “preamble” we
now have. It is important to understand that he is employing the
term in a broader and an older sense, in the manner of some of
the state constitutions—to designate (as he says) a statement of
the rights of man, and the fundamental ends of government.
These matters are more commonly referred to, in Mason’s
language, as a declaration or bill of rights.
Why does Randolph wish to avoid commencing the
Constitution with a bill of rights? The answer, as with so much
else in this draft, is likely connected to slavery and also to
George Mason. In 1776, when Mason wrote the Virginia
Declaration, Edmund Randolph was a member of the drafting
committee. He seems to have played no active role. He was at
the time 22 years old; Mason was 50. But Randolph observed
Mason’s handiwork closely, and it left a lasting impression. In his
History of Virginia, written more than thirty years later,
Randolph recalled the significance of Mason’s work and also the
duplex structure of the Virginia Constitution:
In the formation of this bill of rights two objects were
contemplated: one, that the legislature should not in their acts
violate any of those canons [specified in the bill]; the other,
that in all the revolutions of time, of human opinion, and of
government, a perpetual standard should be erected, around
which the people might rally and by a notorious record be
forever admonished to be watchful, firm, and virtuous.
formation of state governments, seems ^is^ unfit here; since we are not working
on the natural rights ^of men^ not yet gathered into society, but upon those
rights, modified by society, and supporting ^interwoven with^ what we call
states the rights of states.
For a reproduction of the original, see COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 264.
118. I am reading the cancelled “sufficiently executed” as having originally been
intended to refer to the “state governments” later in the sentence.
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The cornerstone being thus laid, a constitution delegating
portions of power to different organs under certain
119
modifications was of course to be raised upon it.

Randolph in 1787 no doubt painfully recalled what had
happened to Mason’s bill of rights during the Virginia debate of
1776. Mason’s draft had declared
That all Men are born equally free and independant [sic], and
have certain inherent natural Rights, of which they cannot by
any Compact, deprive or divest their Posterity; among which
are the Enjoyment of Life and Liberty, with the Means of
acquiring and possessing Property, and pursueing [sic] and
120
obtaining Happiness and Safety.

The Virginia Convention balked at this language, on the grounds
121
that it was not compatible with a slaveholding society. They
changed “are born equally free” to “are by nature equally free,”
122
and “inherent natural rights” to “inherent rights.” The issue, in
the midst of a revolution, consumed five days of debate, until
Edmund Pendleton proposed the insertion of the phrase in
brackets:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent rights, of which, <when they enter into a
state of society,> they cannot, by any compact, deprive or
123
divest their posterity; . . . .

Randolph now dismisses all such formulations about rights and
nature and society as “fitter for the schools” than for a
Constitution. No doubt he wished to avoid a repetition of the
debates that had convulsed the Virginia Convention, and no
doubt he wished to keep at bay the intractable issue of slavery.
This is the likeliest explanation for his opposition to opening the
124
Constitution with a bill of rights.
119. RANDOLPH, supra note 61.
120. 1 MASON PAPERS, supra note 62, at 277.
121. For a full discussion, see the excellent headnote to Mason’s draft, id. at 289–91.
See also BROADWATER, supra note 62, at 84. Randolph himself explicitly noted the
connection to slavery in his History of Virginia. RANDOLPH, supra note 61, at 253.
122. 1 MASON PAPERS, supra note 62, at 289.
123. Id. at 287. See also BROADWATER, supra note 62, at 84.
124. I note in passing—an important point, apparently first pointed out by Akhil
Amar—that the use of the expression “Bill of Rights” to designate the first ten
amendments to the Constitution is in fact a twentieth-century coinage. The intellectual
history here is complex. For an overview, see MAIER, supra note 59, at 459–68.
It should also be observed that, at the time of the Convention, the New England
states and Pennsylvania had all begun the process that would eventually lead to abolition;
Vermont and Massachusetts did so in reliance on their respective bills of rights. This fact,
and the fact that he was serving on a Committee with three delegates from states that had
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Randolph goes on to say that, in his view, a preamble ought
“briefly to represent declare, that the present federal
government is insufficient to the general happiness; that the
conviction of this fact gave birth to this convention; and that the
only effectual meansode which they couldan devise, for curing
this insufficiency, is the establishment of a supreme legislative
125
executive and judiciary.”
The issue raised by this remark was evidently a point of
particular sensitivity for Randolph. By proposing the Virginia
Plan, he had arguably acted ultra vires, exceeding the
Convention’s mandate to amend the Articles of Confederation:
the charge was frequently made, then and since. Document IV
contains, on the last of its five sheets, a discursive passage in
which he returns to the point. He suggests that an attempt be
made to explain to the people the purpose of the document—to
set forth the defects of the Confederation, to show that a reform
of the existing system cannot solve the problems, and to present
the Constitution as the best remedy. He was clearly looking to a
national audience: “[W]e ought,” he says, “to furnish the
advocates ^of the plan^ in the country with some general
126
topics.” Farrand prints this detached sheet as the conclusion to
the Randolph Draft. Perhaps it was intended as a conclusion;
but, in view of Randolph’s earlier remarks, it seems equally
likely that it was intended either as an elaboration of his remarks
on a preamble, or perhaps as an early sketch for an address of
the sort that eventually accompanied the Constitution to
127
Congress, explaining the actions of the Convention. These
already begun the process of abolition, may provide a further explanation for Randolph’s
skittishness about including a bill of rights. I owe the observation to John Mikhail.
125. COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 265.
126. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 150; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 285.
127. Randolph had contemplated the possibility of “an address to accompany the
new constitution” as early as his letter to Madison of March 27, 1787. 9 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 56, at 335. (I owe the point to Mary Bilder.) The first four sheets of
Randolph’s draft are written on both sides, giving eight pages. Most, though not all,
contain annotations by Rutledge. None is numbered by Randolph; somebody
(presumably an archivist at the Library of Congress) has penciled in page numbers. The
fifth sheet is somewhat tidier, contains no remarks by Rutledge, and is written on a single
side. It is on similar paper to the other sheets; all five sheets were found together in the
papers of George Mason. But internally there is nothing to link Randolph’s fifth sheet
conclusively to the others. It begins, “The object of an address is to satisfy the people of
the propriety of the proposed reform.” By “address” here Randolph plainly does not
mean a speech, but a formal, written address of the sort that was discussed in Convention
on September 10, 12, and 15. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 564, 582,
621–23. Such an address was sent to Congress, over Washington’s signature, on
September 17, and in fact makes many of the same points as Randolph’s fifth page. Id. at
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points are not resolvable; but it is clear that the issue of
ratification already weighed on Randolph as he prepared his
draft.
5. Authorship of the Draft
What are we to make of this draft as a whole? It is a complicated document and contains many important innovations. So
that raises the question: Who wrote it? Because Farrand prints it
as Document IV of the Committee of Detail, and because it
contains markings in the handwriting of John Rutledge, it is
usually treated as a product of the Committee’s deliberations.
For instance, Clinton Rossiter says that the Committee first met
and “rummage[d]” to gather materials that might be useful to
128
their purposes. (This is wrong: the Convention itself furnished
the Committee with copies of the Convention resolutions and
with copies of the Pinckney and New Jersey plans). Then, “while
the others looked over his shoulder, Randolph wrote out the
129
rough draft of a constitution.” This is an invention. William
Meigs, in contrast, who first studied Document IV, treats it
130
instead as the work of Randolph. The point is debatable, but I
believe that, on the balance of the evidence, Meigs’s view is
correct.
To see why, let us begin by considering the portion of the
draft that is in Randolph’s handwriting and then turn to the
Rutledge additions. In the first place, Randolph’s introductory
reflections on preambles; his admonition to use simple language;
his recommendations at the end about the strategy of
ratification; his use of “I” in the very last sentence—these things
hardly seem compatible with a report of a document drafted by a

666–67. However, because by September Randolph had decided not to sign the
Constitution, his sheet cannot date from that episode, but from earlier in the
proceedings—most likely from the time of the Committee of Detail, though the fact is
not absolutely certain. That leaves open the question of the precise sequencing of the
fifth sheet. Since Randolph, on his first page, states that the conclusion to the
Constitution should contain a solemn pledge of the parties to observe the new document,
and since his fifth sheet is a direct elaboration of his remarks on preambles, it probably
belongs more properly to the beginning of the document than to its end—though it may
be that he was undecided whether the better vehicle for communicating his points was a
preamble or a separate address to the people.
128. ROSSITER, supra note32, at 201.
129. Id. at 201–02 (“After the Randolph draft had been discussed point by point, and
the chairman had introduced various modifications in his own hand, the fourth and most
decisive stage was taken over by the most learned, experienced, and dedicated member
of the committee, James Wilson.”).
130. MEIGS, supra note 21, at 324.
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committee. Secondly, in terms of the constitutional content of
the draft, almost all the important innovations correspond to
Randolph’s own firm beliefs, as expressed in the Convention—
the distrust of a strong executive, the conception of a powerful
senate, the strong desire for an enumeration of legislative
powers. Randolph was a sophisticated lawyer and certainly
capable of drafting by himself the passages on the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. The exact nuances of his views on slavery are
hard to pin down; but at the least he believed that the “deep
South” provisions were necessary to placate South Carolina.
There is moreover no direct evidence that any other committee
member contributed any of these innovations.
Procedurally, too, Randolph’s authorship would make
sense. The Committee’s formal assignment was to revise the
original Randolph proposals of May 29. What could have been
more appropriate than to ask the distinguished Governor of
Virginia to begin the process? And there is another small clue.
At the beginning of his draft, at the end of his discussion of
preambles, after a passage discussing the need to explain the
decision to abandon the Articles of Confederation, he wrote
(and then deleted) “In this manner we may discharge the first
resolution.” But the first of the Convention resolutions deals
with the tripartite structure of the national government; it says
nothing about amending the Articles. Randolph is instead
131
referring back to the first resolution of his own Virginia Plan.
Later in the manuscript, however, he takes passages from the
Convention resolutions almost verbatim. This suggests that, at
the time he began to write his draft, the Convention resolutions
had not yet been prepared for the use of the Committee. And
indeed, if we look closely, we see that, as soon as the Committee
was appointed, Randolph, up to that point a regular participant
in the Convention debates, delivers no speeches; and after one
critical vote, Madison noted that the Virginia delegation split 2-2
132
because “Mr. Randolph happened to be out of the House.”
This is suggestive. Remember that Mason in 1776 had gone to
work on his own and had essentially drafted both the Virginia
Declaration of Rights and the Virginia Constitution from his
room in the Raleigh Tavern. Randolph, as we saw, was
131. “Resolved that the articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected &
enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely “common
defence, security of liberty and general welfare.” 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
2, at 20 (May 29).
132. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 121 (July 26).
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thoroughly familiar with this precedent. On balance, therefore
(and certainty is not to be had) I am inclined to believe that, as
soon as the Committee was appointed on Tuesday, July 24,
Randolph either decided to emulate Mason’s example or was
asked (as the sponsor of the Randolph plan) to prepare a first
draft; in either case, he absented himself from the Convention in
the days before the Committee first met. On July 25 the
Convention voted to supply the Committee with a copy of the
Convention resolutions. This would explain the discrepancies in
his opening paragraphs.
The Rutledge marginalia present a somewhat harder
problem. His handwriting appears on the Randolph draft and on
the last of the Wilson drafts; this is compatible with his having
presided over Committee meetings in which the drafts were
discussed. There are also small indications (like the shift from
joint to separate balloting for the presidency) that may point to a
committee discussion. On the other hand, most of the changes
Rutledge makes to the Randolph draft are in keeping with his
own views and his heaviest interventions are in the slavery and
navigation provisions, where the interests of South Carolina
were deeply involved. The possibility cannot be excluded that he
and Randolph jointly worked out the slavery provisions before
the Committee first met; certainly both delegates would have
been acutely aware of General Pinckney’s threats (which had
been expressed on Monday). The evidence, however, is
inconclusive. The remaining annotations on this document are
the numerous check-marks. These are in the hand of Wilson and
were most likely made in the course of preparing the subsequent
drafts.
6. Conclusions on Document IV
I have dwelled on Randolph’s draft both for its intrinsic
importance and because it illustrates something significant about
the historiography of the Convention. It is difficult to find
accounts that grant his draft more than a sentence or two. But it
should now be clear that this is a document of the utmost importance. It introduces many striking innovations—the enumeration
of powers, the protection of the slave trade, the rules on exports
and navigation acts, the granting of appointment powers to the
Senate, the specification of the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Moreover, none of the most widespread theories about the
Committee of Detail is able to survive even a casual encounter
with Randolph’s document. The view that the Committee was a
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mere intermission is plainly untenable. The view that the
Committee was “a committee of Wilson and four others” is
equally untenable. Of the major innovations I have just listed,
Wilson would have opposed all but the last. At this stage there is
no clear sign of his participation, even on minor matters. And as
for the theory that Rutledge rather than Wilson dominated (or
even “hijacked”) the sessions, it is of course true that the
Committee acted to protect the interests of the deep South; and
133
it must be the case that Rutledge was deeply involved. But the
first appearance of the objectionable provisions is in Randolph’s
hand, not Rutledge’s.
It is undeniable that Randolph was something of a
“chameleon,” that he was cantankerous, and that in the end he
refused to sign the Constitution. Perhaps for these reasons most
historians place him far down in the rankings of delegates. In his
most visible role at the Convention, when he opened the
proceedings by presenting the Virginia Plan, he is generally
viewed as merely Madison’s mouthpiece. But if the analysis
given here is correct (and complete certainty is not possible)
then Randolph produced Document IV largely on his own; and
this makes him the primary author of the jurisdictional
provisions of Article III. He more broadly has the honor, not
only of having presented the Virginia Plan, but also of having
written the first draft of the Constitution. But it is a very mixed
honor. His positive contributions, though of fundamental
133. A similar point holds for Hueston’s thesis of a hijacking by states’ rights
proponents. Hueston, supra note 36, deserves full credit for seeing the importance of the
Committee of Detail and for trying to disentangle its contributions to federal-state
relations. But his execution of this important insight, in my view, has some serious
limitations. (i) He does not attempt to analyze the individual drafts, or to consider them
in sequence: and thus he misses much of the story of the internal dynamics of the
Committee. (Any discussion of these textual matters must start with the scholarly work
of Jameson and McLaughlin, which he does not mention.) (ii) He lumps together all five
committee members as “states’ rights” advocates: this is simply incorrect, especially for
Wilson, but the matter also requires a more nuanced statement for the others. More
broadly, he does not attempt to tack back-and-forth between the Committee and the
statements of its members in Convention in order to try to work out the individual
contributions; as a result, he misses the subtle and important differences between them.
The fact that most of the drafts are in Wilson’s handwriting is mentioned in passing, but
its importance not appreciated; Randolph’s draft and the Pinckney Plan are not explicitly
analyzed; he misses the contributions of Randolph to the drafting of what would become
Article III. (iii) He overstates his conclusions; in particular, it is not clear that “a strong[]
national model”—in particular, one without enumerated powers—was “the first choice
of the Convention as a whole.” Id. at 782. On the contrary, even the two strongest
nationalists at the Convention, Madison and Wilson, appear to have seen some such
enumeration as inevitable; and many others raised vehement objections to an
unconstrained grant of legislative power to the national government. See infra, notes
184–201 and accompanying text.
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importance, are overshadowed by the provisions on slavery.
Moreover, he had the opportunity to follow the precedent of the
state constitutions, and to begin the national Constitution with a
“preamble,” i.e. a Bill of Rights. That would have been no
radical step; and, as Mason subsequently pointed out to the
Convention, the job could have been accomplished “in a few
134
hours.” But Randolph consciously chose a different course: a
decision that nearly derailed the ratification of the Constitution.
Ironically, he and Mason both refused to sign the final
document: and Mason’s refusal was in large measure based on
the absence of a Bill of Rights. It is these facts that give the
unexplained presence of Randolph’s draft among Mason’s
papers a certain poignancy.
D. DOCUMENT V
We now come to the Wilson drafts, which make up the rest
of the surviving documents from the Committee of Detail. (Of
all the Committee documents, only the Randolph draft is not in
Wilson’s handwriting.) The next document is numbered by
Farrand as “Document V.” This is misleading. It is in fact
written on two different sheets of paper, which are located in
distinct parts of the Wilson archive: Farrand has spliced them
135
together to create a single document.
Wilson’s normal practice in preparing the Committee drafts
was to begin with a large folio sheet, which he folded in half
across its width. This gave him a signature of four pages;
frequently he would write only on the right half of the page,
allowing ample room for subsequent additions. His two full
drafts of the Constitution consist each of several such signatures.
In this instance, he began writing on the outside front page of
the signature, leaving the left-hand side of the page blank. There
are numerous insertions and re-writings. The page (cleaned up,
with some deletions and false starts omitted) began as follows:
The People of the States of New Hampshire &C, ^already
confederated united and known by the Stile of the “United

134. See supra note 79, at 587–88 (Sept. 12) (quoting Mason on the utility and ease of
adding a Bill of Rights).
135. For details, see COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 287, and the
Addendum, id. at 367. Farrand, as he worked his way through the Wilson manuscripts,
doubtless saw that the second sheet fit naturally with the first, and printed the two
together. There is no reason to question his attribution, but it would have been
preferable if he had somewhere noted that the two sheets of paper are in fact distinct
both in their appearance and their physical location.
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States of America”^ do agree upon ordain ^declare^ and
establish the following Frame of Gov.t as the Constitution of
136
the said United States.

He then inserted a “We” before “The People.” This is the first
occurrence of what were to become the famous opening words
of the Constitution.
There follow two brief paragraphs dealing with the national
legislature, whose two chambers he designates (probably
following the terminology of the Pinckney Plan) as the “House
of Representatives” and the “Senate.” In the wide margin he
experiments with the wording. This folio sheet breaks off
halfway down the page. On both sides of a separate, smaller
sheet of paper (headed “The Continuation of the Scheme”) he
lists the topics remaining to be treated. The ordering is the usual
one: legislature—executive—judiciary—miscellaneous. The
sheet is a mere laundry list; no details are given.
The two sheets are only a sketch, and have the look of
something prepared by Wilson for his own purposes, possibly in
the days before the Committee first met. There is no sign of
contributions from other members of the Committee and there
is also no sign that he had seen the Randolph draft. The first
sheet contains a property requirement for the House of
Representatives (of 50 acres of land). Whether this was to be a
restriction on the voters or on the candidates is not clear. The
provision is difficult to reconcile with Wilson’s general position
against limitations on the franchise; but Wilson here would have
been constrained by the explicit instructions of the
137
Convention.
From today’s perspective, the most interesting part of the
document is the opening words. Wilson explicitly grounds the
Constitution in the people of the states, rather than in the states
themselves. The idea of popular sovereignty was central to
Wilson—more central, perhaps, to Wilson than to any other
delegate and certainly more than to any other member of the
138
Committee of Detail. There is a subtle ambiguity in his
formula, “We the People of the States of New Hampshire &c.”
Is this People a single collectivity (i.e. the totality of inhabitants
of these thirteen states)? Or is it instead thirteen separate
136. COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 289. The transcription of these
heavily re-written sentences in Farrand is opaque.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 79–81.
138. See Ewald, supra note 42, passim.
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collectivities? There is no question about Wilson’s own view, and
the formulation “We the People of the United States” would
have been closer to his actual position. But at this stage of the
proceedings it would have been pressing matters to omit the
states altogether. And perhaps he already foresaw that, unless
ratification by the states was to be unanimous, his formula would
need to be changed.
E. DRAFT VI/VIII
1. General Remarks
The documents Farrand labels VI, VII, and VIII need to be
treated as a unit. Draft VI/VIII (as I shall designate it) is a
proper draft of a Constitution—the second after Randolph’s,
and the first clearly produced by the Committee. It is in Wilson’s
hand and incorporates elements both from the Randolph draft
and from the earlier Wilson sketch. Unfortunately it is not
complete. It originally consisted of three folio sheets, each
folded into a four-page signature. But the middle signature has
disappeared.
We are thus left with three pieces. Document VI is the first
signature. It consists of four pages and deals principally with the
composition and election of the House of Representatives and
Senate. Document VIII is the third signature; it deals primarily
with the “miscellaneous” category of topics—ratification, amendments, and the like. It has one curious feature. The first sheet of
Wilson’s Document V filled only the front half-page of a fourpage signature. The thrifty Wilson flipped the signature over to
begin writing Document VIII. This has the consequence that the
first version of “We the People” in Document V appears upsidedown on the last page of Document VIII.
The missing middle signature would have contained, on four
pages, the enumeration of congressional powers, as well as the
treatment of the presidency and the judicial branch. In the
Wilson archive, placed between the first and the third signatures,
was a further document, also written in Wilson’s hand. This
document (Document VII) Jameson identified as a set of
extracts from the New Jersey Plan, followed by a set of extracts
from the Pinckney Plan. The two sets of excerpts are written
onto a single four-page folio signature; the passages deal with
the powers of Congress, and with the executive and judicial
branches, i.e. precisely the topics that would have been treated
in the missing signature. It is highly unlikely that any of Wilson’s

!!!EWALD-282-THECOMMITTEEOFDETAILACCEPTED.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL

12/13/2012 2:08 PM

249

descendants would have known enough about the workings of
the Committee of Detail to have expertly placed this sheet
precisely where Jameson found it, between the two surviving
sheets of the Committee draft. This suggests that the placement
was made by Wilson himself, and perhaps that the missing
middle sheet had already disappeared during his lifetime: but
there is no way to be sure.
Draft VI/VIII adopted Wilson’s opening words, originally in
the form, “We the People and the States of New Hampshire
&C.” But Wilson altered that formulation back to his original
(and far more Wilsonian) “We the People of the States.” The
draft also provides that the new government is to be called the
“United People and States of America”—also a Wilsonian
139
formula, but this time with echoes of the Roman republic.
A few general remarks about VI/VIII are in order. The
entire draft is in Wilson’s hand. There are in particular no
annotations by Rutledge. Only on the somewhat messy last page
of the first signature do we find a number of items checked off
(again, in Wilson’s hand). It is often said that Rutledge served as
the Committee’s chairman, but the evidence is not conclusive. It
is true that his name appears first in Madison’s list of the
members of the Committee and also true that he presented the
final report to the Convention. But it is not clear from these facts
that the Convention designated him chairman, or even that such
a small Committee had a formal presiding officer. His handwritten interventions occur only on two documents (the
Randolph draft and the final draft) and these facts are capable of
any number of explanations. The check marks in particular are
compatible with Wilson’s having presided over Committee
discussions, though it is more likely that he made them as he
compared one draft with another. In any case, Wilson made
numerous interventions and alterations to this draft. Inspection
shows that virtually all of them are stylistic—interventions to
adjust the wording, or to render a provision more clearly, but
none that changes anything of substance. Although it is possible

139. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 152. Wilson, like many of the
delegates, was thoroughly steeped in the history of Rome, and this phrase was clearly
intended to evoke the ancient formula, Senatus publiusque romanus—“the Senate and
People of Rome”—abbreviated on coins and public buildings as “SPQR.” Notice that, in
a Wilsonian twist, Draft VI/VIII inverts the order, and places the People first. This
formula was however dropped in Draft IX in favor of the “United States of America.”
Id. at 163.
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that these editorial changes were made in Committee, it seems
likelier that they were made by Wilson in private.
The first and last signatures adopt the substance (and often
the language) of the Randolph draft, with the additions that
were made in Rutledge’s hand. They add several new provisions
that go beyond anything authorized in the Convention
resolutions, and (as we shall see) with which Wilson clearly
disagreed. For this reason, the draft can confidently be regarded
as the work of the Committee and not of Wilson alone. But this
raises the question of when the draft was produced. The most
reasonable conjecture is that the Committee met to discuss the
Randolph draft; that certain changes were voted upon; that
Wilson was then designated to write the next draft; and that
VI/VIII is the result.
Most of the work of this draft consists in a tightening of the
language, sharpening the formulations of ideas that were already
present in earlier versions. So we get carefully worded clauses
guaranteeing to the states a republican form of government and
specifying procedures for the ratification and subsequent
140
amendment of the Constitution. The Committee added from
the Articles of Confederation a cumbersome procedure for
resolving disputes over territorial boundaries between states,
and, out of logical sequence at the very end of document VIII,
inserted a stipulation of the veto power of the President (who is
141
here referred to as the “Governor”). These last two provisions
would have been of special interest to Wilson; but the evidence
does not exist to say whether they were added at his specific
142
instigation.
140. Id. at 159–60; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 313–14. The
Convention resolutions had stipulated that ratification was to be by state conventions
selected for the purpose, but had left open the question of whether ratification need be
unanimous. The Randolph draft provided for a less-than-unanimous ratification, but left
the exact number blank, as does the first Wilson draft. Similarly, the Convention
resolutions had specified only that “Provision ought to be made for the Amendment of
the Articles of Union, whensoever it shall seem necessary.” 2 CONVENTION RECORDS,
supra note 2, at 133. The Randolph draft (in Rutledge’s handwriting) provided for
amendment by a new Convention, to be called by Congress on the application of twothirds of the state legislatures.
141. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 132; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 317.
142. His views on the absolute presidential veto were repeatedly expressed during
the Convention. See, e.g., 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 100; 2 CONVENTION
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 300. As for the provision concerning territorial boundaries
and disputes between states, Wilson, unlike the other Committee members, had
extensive experience in litigating such territorial disputes under the arrangements of the
Articles; though that fact could just as well have made him hostile to the existing
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2. Controversial New Provisions
None of these various provisions was especially
controversial, and Wilson likely assented to them all. But Draft
VI/VIII also added three novel provisions which had not been
approved by the Convention, and which Wilson would certainly
have resisted. First, it provided that the States were to specify
the qualifications of the electors of the lower house, and the
time, place, and manner of holding elections, subject to
143
regulation by Congress. Secondly, it granted to Congress the
power to introduce whatever property qualifications for
members of either chamber of the national legislature it found
144
expedient. It retained the Randolph draft’s assignment to the
Senate of the power to make treaties (as well as the power to
145
appoint Justices of the Supreme Court). Finally, it provided
that the salaries of members of both houses of Congress were to
146
be set and paid by the state legislatures. Wilson might
reluctantly have accepted the first of these provisions because of
its inclusion of a congressional override, and the second as
reflecting the express instructions of the Convention; but the
other two run contrary to his core principles.
The final provision is especially significant for the light it
sheds on the internal workings of the Committee. The
Convention had in fact earlier voted, on June 12, by a vote of 83, that the wages of members of the lower house should be paid
147
out of the national treasury. In that discussion, Connecticut
and South Carolina both voted for payment by the state
legislatures. On June 26, this time by a margin of 6-5, the
Convention voted that the upper house as well be paid out of the
national treasury. Again, Connecticut and South Carolina voted
arrangements. I note in passing that the Committee assigned the power to adjudicate
such disputes to the Senate, rather than to the legislature as a whole. It is an interesting
though irresolvable question whether Wilson would have approved this assignment. The
matter can be argued either way.
143. Id. at 153. The Committee in this draft also hesitated between whether the
qualifications for electors of the national legislature should be the same as for the largest
house of the state legislature, or whether the states should be allowed to set the
requirements, subject to a congressional override. Id. at 163–64.
144. Id. at 155–56.
145. Id. at 155. Randolph had given the Senate the power to appoint the full federal
judiciary; Wilson’s version (which is written into the margin of his draft) thus represents
a return to the position of the Convention resolutions, which had given the Senate the
power to appoint the Supreme Court only.
146. Id. at 156. Oddly, Rutledge’s Draft IV had originally provided that the wages of
Senators should be paid out of the national treasury; but he crossed out this provision in
the draft. Id. at 142.
147. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 215–16.
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on the losing side; and, in this second vote, Oliver Ellsworth both
introduced and spoke for the losing resolution. Wilson
vigorously opposed the motion on the grounds that the Senators
148
would then be entirely the creatures of the state legislatures. In
the light of this earlier history, it is hard to resist the conclusion
that Rutledge and Ellsworth seized the opportunity to try to
reverse their earlier defeats. They must have obtained the
support of Randolph or Gorham, since this provision survived
into the final draft presented by the Committee to the
149
Convention.
3. Slavery, State Power, and Wilson’s Predicament
Let us now briefly take stock. Draft VI/VIII is the first draft
of the Constitution that can confidently be attributed to the
Committee. The Committee, as instructed, had cleaned up the
Convention resolutions, and filled in many details in broad
accordance with its instructions. But it had also added a number
of provisions of its own, several of which went far beyond or
even contradicted the earlier votes of the Convention. There is a
common pattern to these innovations that we must now
consider.
The Randolph Draft had sought to limit the reach of the
national government by adding an explicit enumeration of
congressional powers. Within the national government itself,
Randolph (who deeply feared a “monarchical” single executive)
assigned several important executive powers, and in particular
powers involving foreign affairs, not to the President, but to the
Senate. His draft had also sought to safeguard the interests of
the southern states by adding provisions concerning taxation of
exports, navigation acts, and the slave trade. And now, in
VI/VIII, the influence of the states over the national legislature
has been augmented by several provisions, especially the one
allowing each state to set the salaries of its representatives.
Taken together, these innovations represent a large shift of
power away from the national government and towards the
states. Wilson might have acquiesced in some of these changes,
148. Id. at 428–29, 433–34. As Wilson put the point: “In the present case, the states
may say, although I appoint you for six years, yet if you are against the state, your table
will be unprovided. Is this the way you are to erect an independent government?” Id. at
434. (This quotation occurs in the untrustworthy notes by Yates; but here there is no
reason to suspect any inaccuracy.) These two votes did not make their way into the
Convention resolutions: presumably this was an error of transcription.
149. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 180 (Aug. 6).
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but the totality must have filled him with foreboding. So we must
face the questions: How were these changes introduced? Which
of the committee members supplied the necessary third vote?
What was Wilson’s situation, and how did he react?
One very general warning is now in order. As we proceed, it
is vital to bear in mind the limitations on our knowledge that I
mentioned at the outset. There is much we do not know; and
theories that depict the Committee of Detail as engaged in an
attempt to “hijack” the Constitution are on shaky ground.
Rutledge and Randolph have manifest character flaws. But they
were not fools. No doubt, in drafting the Constitution, they
nudged matters in the direction that they thought best. But is it
likely that they thought they could engage in a wholesale rewriting? That they believed nobody would notice? Or could it be
that it is we who are missing some piece of information? The
hijack theorists tacitly assume that we have full knowledge of
what was expected of the Committee. But that is plainly not
correct.
Consider, for example, the account of the appointment of
150
the Committee as it appears in Madison’s Notes. He tells us,
first, that Elbridge Gerry moved the creation of a Committee to
draft a Constitution, conformable to the Convention resolutions,
but not to treat the executive. Then General Pinckney issues his
threat on the slave trade and navigation acts. Then the
Convention rejected a Committee of ten members, then of
seven, before finally settling on five. Gerry’s reservation about
the executive is never again mentioned: the Notes do not tell us
what happened to it. One imagines that somebody must have
said something in response to General Pinckney: again, the Notes
are silent. Real discussions do not happen like that. Did there
occur a brief discussion after General Pinckney’s remarks? Was
it suggested that the Committee come up with a proposal on
slavery, subject of course to later scrutiny? We do not know. But
the idea that Rutledge believed he could somehow use the
Committee to stage a kind of coup d’état is even more
improbable, and I see no evidence that the Committee was
engaged in any such enterprise.
In the absence of detailed documentation, a great deal must
be conjectured; but certain facts can be stated with confidence.
In the first place, the provisions concerning slavery and
navigation acts must have originated from the two Southerners
150. Id. at 95–96 (July 23).
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on the Committee, Randolph and Rutledge. That much is clear;
but there remain a number of puzzles. Randolph himself later in
the Convention spoke passionately about the need for a
151
supermajority for acts regulating commerce and also about the
need to restrict the powers of the central government (which he
152
viewed as a threat to the independence of the States). But, as
we saw, during the August 22 debate he spoke against the
provision safeguarding the slave trade that had emerged from
153
the Committee of Detail. That clause read (in relevant part):
“No tax or duty shall be laid by the Legislature . . . on the
migration or importation of such persons as the several States
shall think proper to admit; nor shall such migration or
154
importation be prohibited.” Randolph declared, in opposition
to a clause whose substance he had himself drafted,
He could never agree to the clause as it stands. He wd. sooner
risk the constitution—. . . By agreeing to the clause, it would
revolt the Quakers, the Methodists, and many others in the
States having no slaves. On the other hand, two States might
155
be lost to the Union.

As I have sought to emphasize, Edmund Randolph is hardly the
Convention’s most consistent delegate. In taking this position, he
aligned himself with the position taken by most of the Virginia
delegates, and against the more radical delegates from the deep
156
South—including, notably, John Rutledge, who spoke in favor.
These observations suggest that, whatever may be true for
export taxes and navigation acts, the primary mover within the
Committee on slavery was Rutledge.
That observation raises a further question. Only Rutledge
and Randolph came from states where slavery was a significant

151. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 452–53 (Aug. 29).
152. Id. at 631 (Sept 15); cf. id. at 17–18 (July 16).
153. Id. at 374.
154. The clause is § VI. 4 of the Committee Report. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, id. at
183 (Aug. 6).
155. Id. at 374. These remarks have sometimes been construed as a denunciation of
slavery, but are more plausibly viewed as a call for a compromise between the positions
of South Carolina and “the Quakers.” I note in passing that Mary Bilder has shown that
Madison’s Notes for late August were written up after the Convention had ended: there
is especial reason for treating them with caution.
156. Rutledge expressed his view to the Convention on August 22:
If the Convention thinks that N.C; S.C.& Georgia will ever agree to the plan,
unless their right to import slaves be untouched, the expectation is vain. The
people of those States will never be such fools as to give up so important an
interest.
Id. at 373.
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economic interest. So how did the “deep South” provisions
secure a majority of votes on the five-member Committee?
At this point it is necessary to clear away two widespread
legends about Rutledge. One is the legend of a secret dinner
meeting between Rutledge and Roger Sherman on June 30 at
which they are said to have worked out the terms of an alliance
157
between Connecticut and South Carolina. The second is the
claim that Rutledge was a close friend of Wilson’s, and indeed
that Rutledge lodged in Wilson’s house in the opening weeks of
158
the Convention. Both claims have been frequently asserted in
the scholarly literature. The second in particular has been used
to support the thesis that Wilson and Rutledge worked together
to “hijack” the Constitution. Both claims have their origin in
what can only be termed a colorful 1942 biography of
159
Rutledge. The author of the only other biography, published in
1997, makes the unusual observation—unusual, at any rate, for
an opening paragraph—that he found the earlier book so
160
unreliable that he decided to ignore it altogether. I have been
able to find no documentary support for either legend and
suspect them to be fabrications.
The story about the “secret dinner” does, however, contain
a kernel of truth. There was certainly by the end of the
Convention an alliance between the states of the deep South and
the states of New England: and Connecticut and South Carolina
were in the thick of it. By late August, when the delegates from
Connecticut were vigorously defending the South Carolina
position on slavery, it was clear to everybody at the Convention
161
that a back-room bargain had been struck. The issue arose into
public view on August 21. Of particular interest are a set of

157. The longest discussion of the June 30 meeting and its significance is in FORREST
MCDONALD, E PLURIBUS UNUM: THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776–1790, at 176–78 (1965).
158. Wilson’s chief biographer, Charles Page Smith, repeats this claim. CHARLES
PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER, 1742–1798, at 203 (1956) (characterizing Rutledge as an “intimate friend” of Wilson’s). STEWART, supra note 45, at 165
and BEEMAN, supra note 5, at 269 n. 22, both follow his account. So, too, unfortunately,
does Ewald, supra note 42, at 984.
159. RICHARD BARRY, MR. RUTLEDGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1942).
160. JAMES HAW, JOHN AND EDWARD RUTLEDGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA vii (1997)
(“The only previous biography of John Rutledge, Richard Barry’s Mr. Rutledge of South
Carolina . . ., is unreliable. I have followed the advice of Professor George C. Rogers, Jr.,
to ignore Barry’s book in writing this biography.”).
161. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 370–73 (Aug. 22). That there was a
deal is even clearer from the debates of August 28. Madison explicitly notes the fact of
the deal in his footnote to the proceedings of August 29. Id. at 449.
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remarks by two members of the Committee of Detail discussing
the importation of slaves:
Mr. Rutlidge did not see how the importation of slaves could
be encouraged by this section . . . Religion & humanity had
nothing to do with this question—Interest alone is the
governing principle with Nations . . . If the Northern States
consult their interest, they will not oppose the increase of
Slaves which will increase the commodities of which they will
become the carriers.
Mr. Elseworth was for leaving the clause as it stands. [L]et
every state import what it pleases. The morality or wisdom of
slavery are considerations belonging to the States themselves—What enriches a part enriches the whole, and the
162
States are the best judges of their particular interest.

The exact terms of the quid pro quo are uncertain: but that there
163
was a deal is not. The fact that Rutledge on the Committee of
Detail was able to secure three votes for the “deep South”
position strongly suggests that a bargain was already in place by
the end of July. If that is so, he could count on both Ellsworth of
Connecticut and Randolph of Virginia to support the position of
South Carolina.
When we gather together these various pieces of
information we arrive at the following broad picture. Randolph
was passionate about navigation acts, about restraining the
powers of the central government and of the “monarchical”
presidency; he was also open to cooperation with Rutledge on
the issue of slavery. Rutledge was a zealous defender of slavery
and navigation acts; and he had moreover likely already reached
an understanding on these matters with the Connecticut
delegation, here represented by Ellsworth. He was also a
164
Ellsworth, too,
supporter of enumerated federal powers.
165
supported enumerated powers and the right of the Southern

162. Id. at 364.
163. Madison’s footnote, id. at 364, 369, 414–15, asserts that the deal concerned
slavery and navigation. MCDONALD, supra note 157, at 179–80, criticizes the idea that a
supermajority requirement for navigation acts was in the interest of the New England
states and argues instead that Connecticut’s western land claims were involved. But why
other New England states would have entered into an agreement to benefit Connecticut
he leaves unexplained. Another possibility (suggested by the remarks of Ellsworth and
Rutledge) seems to me more likely: that the New England states feared the loss of
shipping revenue if South Carolina and Georgia were to leave the Union.
164. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 53 (May 31); 2 CONVENTION
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 17 (July 16).
165. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 53–54 (May 31).
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states to set their own position on slavery. He, in turn, was
especially passionate about the rights of small states. He put the
point in an eloquent speech on June 30:
Under a National Govt. he should participate in the National
Security . . . but that was all. What he wanted was domestic
happiness. The Natl. Govt. could not descend to the local
objects on which this depended. It could only embrace objects
of a general nature. He turned his eyes therefore for the
preservation of his rights to the State Govts. From these alone
he could derive the greatest happiness he expects in this life.
His happiness depends on their existence, as much as a new166
born infant on its mother for nourishment.

It seems likely, therefore, on the balance of the evidence,
that Randolph, Rutledge, and Ellsworth provided three solid
votes for a group of interlocking issues: enumerating congressional powers, restraining the national government, limiting the
powers of the presidency, requiring a supermajority for navigation acts, protecting slavery, protecting exports, and defending
the powers of the state governments.
If this analysis of the situation is correct, then Wilson faced
the following predicament. On the one hand, he was by significant distance the most powerful intellect on the Committee—so
much so that many historians have simply assumed that he must
have dominated the proceedings. On the other hand, on the
issues we are considering, he almost certainly found himself
outvoted by those three delegates.
What of the final member of the Committee, Nathaniel
Gorham? Unlike the others, Gorham was not a lawyer and so
would have been in any case a weak ally for Wilson. In the
Convention itself he spoke only sporadically and relatively
briefly and appears not to have expressed himself on many of
the most fundamental issues. But he, too, explicitly favored an
167
enumeration of powers ; and he too, although he represented
Massachusetts, was sympathetic to small government (and
indeed several times suggested that the larger states be split
168
up). When the time came for the debate in August about
166. Id., at 492 (June 30). The last sentence was inserted by Madison from the notes
of Yates.
167. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 17 (July 16).
168. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 540 (July 6); see id. at 462
(recounting Gorham’s speech in which he supports small government) (June 29); see also
2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 94 (citing Gorham’s argument that some of
the large states would presumably be split into smaller states). It should be remembered
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navigation acts and slavery, Gorham took an intermediate
position. He spoke on August 22 against a supermajority
169
requirement for navigation acts; but his comments came at the
beginning of the debate and could have been a feint. Three days
later, on August 25, came the revealing vote to extend the
protection of the slave trade from 1800 to 1808. The vote pitted
the states of New England and the deep South against the
middle states. Pennsylvania and Virginia voted against the
170
proposal. The motion emanated from South Carolina: and it
was seconded by Gorham. Gorham thus emerges as a supporter
of the alliance between New England and South Carolina. If that
was his position three weeks earlier, then Wilson, far from
dominating the Committee, would have been, on the most
contentious issues, outvoted by a margin of four-to-one.
How, then, should he respond? On the one hand, to have
dissented openly from the final Committee report would have
risked re-opening the antagonisms of the preceding weeks and
possibly undermined the ability of the Convention to reach
171
agreement on a Constitution. On the other hand, he did not
have the votes in Committee to reverse Rutledge’s innovations.
But such a shrewd strategist must also have seen that several of
those innovations could most likely be overturned in
Convention. So he apparently decided to bide his time. In the
meantime, he would concentrate his efforts on mitigating the
effects of the Committee innovations. If that was his strategy, it
was a good one. In the closing Act III of the Convention he
systematically argued against and defeated the objectionable
172
portions of the Committee Report. We do not know exactly
what negotiations occurred between Wilson and the others, or
that states such as Massachusetts and Virginia were in fact broken into smaller pieces,
yielding the states of Maine and Kentucky.
169. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 374 (“He desired it to be
remembered that the Eastern States had no motive to Union but a commercial one. They
were able to protect themselves. They were not afraid of external danger, and did not
need the aid of the Southn. States.”).
170. Id. at 415–16 (Aug. 25).
171. I note in passing that, in the final days of the Convention, the delegates faced
great pressure, despite their individual reservations about the Constitution, to give it
their public support. There was great effort to try to achieve the appearance of
unanimity, and the few non-signers afterwards seem to have been regarded by their
fellow delegates as having in a certain measure betrayed the Convention. These
pressures for unanimity were greater in the eighteenth century than they are today; and
they would have been felt by the members of the Committee of Detail as well as within
the Convention as a whole.
172. This topic lies beyond the scope of this paper. For a summary, see Ewald, supra
note 42, at 993–1003.
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whether Wilson threatened to withhold his assent. (As
Madison’s Notes make clear, he was certainly capable of playing
the bully, and of making threats “in terrorem” against other
173
members. ) Whatever the internal dynamics, the next
document, Farrand’s “Document IX,” contains several subtle
additions which cumulatively swing the balance back in the
direction of a strong national government.
F. DRAFT IX
Draft IX is the longest of the Wilson drafts—twenty-two
pages of writing in six of his folded folio signatures. The draft
begins with Wilson’s “We the People of the States,” taken from
Document V. This draft, like the Randolph draft, contains
marginalia in the hand of John Rutledge. Some of the Rutledge
alterations are merely stylistic, but many involve matters of
substance. For that reason, it seems most likely that these
changes were introduced at a Committee meeting, with Rutledge
174
in the chair. The draft retains the problematic provisions from
earlier drafts: our concern is now with the new items. The most
important involve the executive and, above all, the system of
federal-state relations.
1. The Federalism Clauses
As we saw, it was not the Convention as a whole, but the
Committee of Detail that formulated the textual provisions that
lie at the heart of American federalism: the enumeration of
federal powers, the Necessary and Proper Clause, the restrictions on the powers of the states, and the supremacy clause.
Each of these provisions has a complex intellectual history, both
before and after the Convention. It is in Document IX that they
for the first time coalesce with the Draft IV provisions on federal
courts to form a recognizable system of federal-state relations;

173. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 123, n.* (June 5).
174. There are some subtle matters that raise questions about the process of
drafting. Wilson originally provided (in conformity with draft VI/VIII) that the
qualifications of the electors of the legislature were to be prescribed by the legislatures of
the states, subject to a congressional override. He deleted this passage; his replacement
provides that the qualifications in each state are to be the same as those for the most
numerous branch of the state legislature, and (I presume reluctantly) drops the override
provision. There is a check mark beside the change, apparently by Wilson. Wilson later
explained to the Convention that this provision had been carefully considered by the
Committee, which suggests that he, too, and not just Rutledge, at times marked up the
drafts during the Committee discussions. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 201
(Aug. 7).
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and in this document they reach their near-final form. The next
several weeks were to add refinements, but the core remained
remarkably unchanged. It is not my purpose here to discuss the
broader intellectual history. The task is rather to focus on the
work of the Committee itself—to try to understand (as far as the
documents permit) how these provisions were assembled, by
whom, and with what intent.
a. Overview: “Resolution VI”
I begin with some preliminary points.
Let us begin by considering more closely the powers
assigned by the Convention to the national government. Broadly
speaking, the delegates had a choice between several models.
The first was the model of the Articles of Confederation.
Here three ingredients are central. First, the Articles provide in
Article II that “Each state retains its sovereignty . . . and every
Power . . . which is not by this confederation expressly delegated” to Congress. Article IX then enumerates the powers of
the Confederation Congress. (This enumeration, as we saw,
provided most of the items for Randolph’s enumeration in Draft
IV.) Finally, in what might be called a “quasi-supremacy” clause,
Article XIII provides that “Every State shall abide by the
determination of [Congress], on all questions which by this
confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this
confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State . . . .”
The state constitutions, in contrast, followed a variety of
patterns. Many contained no explicit grant of legislative power at
all: for instance, George Mason’s Virginia Constitution of 1776
provides that “[t]he legislative, executive, and judiciary
department, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither
exercise the powers properly belonging to the other.” But Mason
175
leaves any further specification of those powers entirely tacit.
Other constitutions contained an enumeration supplemented by
a general grant of legislative authority. The Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776 is an example. It lists a number of explicit
legislative powers, then concludes with a broad “necessity
clause,” stating that the legislature “shall have all other powers
necessary for the legislature of a free state or commonwealth:
But they shall have no power to add to, alter, abolish, or infringe

175. 7 THORPE, supra note 67, at 3815; MASON PAPERS, supra note 62.
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176

any part of this constitution.”
The formulation in the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 is extremely convoluted. It
lists some legislative powers; then grants the broad general
authority to make “all manner of wholesome and reasonable
orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances, directions and
instructions, either with penalties or without; so as the same be
not repugnant or contrary to this constitution, as they shall judge
177
to be for the good and welfare of this commonwealth . . . .” —
and then, in a continuation to the same long sentence, goes on to
list various other explicit powers. These three state constitutions
were well known to the members of the Convention, as of course
were the Articles.
At this point, we must consider the scholarly controversy
concerning “Resolution VI.” It is sometimes said—historically, it
is the dominant view—that the Convention as a whole
considered a broad grant of power, stated in Resolution VI of
the Virginia Plan, but ultimately rejected this language in favor
of an explicit enumeration. Hueston goes further, arguing that
the Convention itself actually adopted a broad grant, but that
the states’ rights advocates on the Committee of Detail
circumvented its instructions, thereby “altering the course of the
178
Convention.” More recently a group of constitutional scholars,
also noticing that the Convention explicitly adopted a variant of
Resolution VI and included it in the Convention resolutions,
sees the work of the Committee not as a subversion of
179
Resolution VI, but as an attempt to carry it into effect. The
point is stated by Jack Balkin. Resolution VI, he says,
was the animating purpose of the list of enumerated powers
that appeared in the final draft, and it was the key explanation
that framer James Wilson offered to the public when he
defended the proposed Constitution at the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention. . . . As Wilson explained, the purpose of
enumeration was not to displace the principle, but to enact
180
it[.]

176. 5 THORPE, supra note 67, at 3085.
177. 3 THORPE, supra note 67, at 1894.
178. Hueston, supra note 36, at 767, 770.
179. Kurt Lash provides a list of “Resolution VI” scholars, including Akhil Amar,
Jack Balkin, Robert Cooter, Andrew Koppelman, and Neil Siegel; he also documents the
increasing use of Resolution VI in briefs filed before the Supreme Court. Kurt T. Lash,
‘Resolution VI’: National Authority to Resolve Collective Action Problems Under Article
I, Section 8, ILLINOIS PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPERS SERIES
NO. 10–40 2 (Jan. 2012).
180. JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 145 (2011); this quotation forms part of a
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In other words, we can distinguish three models for the
enumeration:
(i) an express enumeration of powers (as in the Articles), with
a presumption that any power not thus “expressly delegated”
is retained by the states;
(ii) an explicit enumeration of powers, but with the powers
themselves being broadly construed under a necessity clause;
on this view, Resolution VI served in the debates as a
placeholder, but was fully discharged when the final
enumeration and necessity clause was adopted; or,
(iii) an illustrative enumeration of powers, with the powers
not exhausting the grant, but being supplemented by the
181
principle of Resolution VI. On this view, the enumeration
serves as a kind of placeholder for Resolution VI, whose
underlying principle remains operative.

The work of the Committee is central to this issue, and the
role of Wilson is likely to have been pivotal. Hamilton excepted,
he was probably the most ardent nationalist at the Convention.
And he stands in a particularly close relationship to Resolution
VI.
At this point we need to take account of an extremely
perceptive observation about Wilson recently made by John
182
Mikhail. Wilson came to the Convention with considerable
experience as a constitutional litigator. In particular, he had
thought deeply about the constitutionality of the establishment
of a national bank under the Articles of Confederation. This
much is well known; but Mikhail’s important observation is that
the specific language of Resolution VI likely comes, not (as had
previously been assumed) from Madison’s pre-Convention
writings but from Wilson’s Considerations on the Bank of North
183
America, published in 1785. Mikhail’s argument, based both on
linguistic similarities and on the absence of the relevant portions
wider discussion of Resolution VI directed largely against the position of Randy Barnett.
Id. at 143–49. Balkin’s historical argument has been severely criticized by Lash, supra
note 179, passim.
181. The term “illustrative” I borrow from Calvin H. Johnson, The Dubious
Enumerated Powers Doctrine, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 25 (2005).
182. John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, Part 2: Foregoing Powers v.
All Other Powers, BALKINIZATION (Aug. 22, 2011), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/
08/necessary-and-proper-clauses-part-2.html. Mikhail, for good analytical reasons, breaks
the Necessary and Proper Clause into three distinct clauses; this refinement is not
necessary for the more limited analysis given here.
183. Reprinted in JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 60
(Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
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of Resolution VI from Madison’s earlier writings, is persuasive,
as is his conjecture that Wilson’s language was adopted into the
Virginia Plan when the Pennsylvania and Virginia delegations
met before the opening of the Convention. Mikhail’s wider
argument about the Necessary and Proper Clause is subtle and
important and cannot be explored here. But the importance of
his observation to our present topic should be evident. At the
very least, Mikhail has established that Wilson had publicly and
conspicuously argued for a broad constitutional principle in
language nearly identical to Resolution VI; and that fact is
relevant to our understanding of the formulation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause in Document IX.
One final point. As we proceed, it is important not to treat
the various federalism clauses in isolation from one another.
They were intended to form a system; and (although full proof is
impossible) it is reasonable to think of the new elements in Draft
IX as a Wilsonian rejoinder to the earlier drafts.
b. Enumeration of Powers
Let us start with enumeration of powers; as we saw, the
Randolph enumeration made its first appearance in Draft IV.
The issue of enumeration had arisen several times in the
course of the Convention, and on those occasions members of
the Committee of Detail expressed their views. Resolution VI of
the Virginia Plan was introduced by Randolph on May 29. The
relevant portion stipulated:
that the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy
the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate
States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the
United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
184
Legislation.

When Resolution VI came up for discussion on May 31,
Rutledge and Charles Pinckney “objected to the vagueness of
the term incompetent, and said they could not well decide how to
vote until they should see that an exact enumeration of the
185
powers comprehended by this definition.” (This is all Madison
tells us; he does not distinguish the speech of Rutledge from that
of Pinckney.) Pierce Butler then “repeated his fears that we

184. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 21.
185. Id. at 53 (May 31).
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were running into an extreme in taking away the powers of the
States, and called on Mr. Randolp[h] for the extent of his
meaning.”
Challenged thus vigorously, Randolph, who had introduced
Resolution VI in the first place, gave his explanation of its
meaning. The quotation is important, for it inevitably influenced
the Convention’s understanding, not just of Resolution VI, but
of the role it was to play in their own deliberations.
Randolph explained that he “disclaimed any intention to
give indefinite powers to the national Legislature.” Indeed, in
characteristic fashion he declared his inflexibility, stating
that he was entirely opposed to such an inroad on the State
jurisdictions, and that he did not think any considerations
whatever could ever change his determination. His opinion
186
was fixed on this point.

There is no good reason to doubt his statement: after all, it was
187
partly on this issue that he refused to sign the Constitution.
As for Madison on that day, his own Notes report:
Mr. Madison said that he had brought with him into the
Convention a strong bias in favor of an enumeration and
definition of the powers necessary to be exercised by the
national Legislature; but had also brought doubts concerning
its practicability. His wishes remained unaltered; but his
doubts had become stronger. What his opinion might
188
ultimately be he could not yet tell.

According to the notes of Pierce, Madison admonished the
Convention, saying “it was necessary to adopt some general
principles on which we should act,—that we were wandering
from one thing to another without seeming to be settled in any
189
one principle.” Pierce also reports that, towards the end of the
discussion, Randolph, Wilson, and Madison all expressed their
190
doubts about the possibility of an enumeration. But Randolph
(if Pierce records him correctly) adds an important qualifier: the
enumeration, he said, was impossible “just at this time.” After
these discussions, the Convention voted to adopt Resolution VI.
186. Id.
187. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 489, 563–64.
188. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 53 (May 31).
189. Id. at 60.
190. Id. The remark of Wilson’s is similar to those of Randolph and Madison: “Mr.
Wilson observed that it would be impossible to enumerate the powers which the federal
Legislature ought to have.” His remark is not recorded in Madison’s Notes.
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Only Roger Sherman, generally considered the strongest
defender of the powers of the states, is recorded as having voted
against.
The evidence here is far from conclusive. The Convention
adopted Resolution VI of the Randolph Plan, but only after
Randolph had forcefully stated his understanding of what it
entailed. It might be that Wilson or Madison favored a broad
grant of power, with no enumeration; but, if so, their position (at
least as reported by Madison) is hardly expressed with the clarity
of which they were capable. The evidence, such as it is, appears
to me stronger that the Convention accepted Randolph’s
emphatic declaration and regarded Resolution VI as a
temporary placeholder, operative “just at this time,” with details
to be filled in later. This is one of those many places where one
would like to know more, but where the evidence runs out.
It is worthwhile to notice that Madison, in a long and careful
letter to John Tyler written many years later, discusses the
relevant portion of Resolution VI, saying of the phrases about
“state incompetence” and the “harmony of the United States”:
It can not be supposed that these descriptive phrases were to
be left in their indefinite extent to Legislative discretion. A
selection & definition of the cases embraced by them was to
be the task of the Convention. If there could be any doubt
that this was intended, & so understood by the Convention, it
would be removed by the course of proceedings on them as
191
recorded, in its Journal.

One must of course treat subsequent recollections with caution;
but Madison does appear to be accurately reporting the
understanding of the Convention.
On July 7, in the middle of the “great debate,” the issue of
enumeration briefly resurfaced. Elbridge Gerry suggested that
the Convention now attempt an enumeration. Madison replied
that such an enumeration could not yet be made—not at this
stage in the proceedings, before the issue of representation in
192
the second branch of the legislature had been settled. He did
not reject the idea of an enumeration as such.

191. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 526–27. (Letter of Madison to John
Tyler, internally dated to 1833, and probably never sent.)
192. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 551 (“Mr. Madison, observed that it
wd. be impossible to say what powers could be safely & properly vested in the Govt.
before it was known, in what manner the States were to be represented in it.”).
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There matters rested throughout the rest of the great
debate. On July 16, immediately after the vote on the
“Connecticut Compromise,” the issue arose again. Madison, who
had just suffered a crushing defeat, was no doubt distracted, and
his Notes for that day are terse. The Convention was again asked
to consider Resolution VI:
Mr. Butler calls for some explanation of the extent of this
power; particularly of the word incompetent. The vagueness of
the terms rendered it impossible for any precise judgment to
be formed.
Mr. Ghorum [sic]. The vagueness of the terms constitutes the
propriety of them. We are now establishing general principles,
to be extended hereafter into details which will be precise &
explicit.

Gorham’s remark here as recorded by Madison is not entirely
transparent; but he, like Randolph and the rest of the
Convention, appears to have expected and favored an
enumeration at some later point in the proceedings. His remarks
were immediately followed by Rutledge:
Mr. Rutlidge, urged the objection started by Mr. Butler and
moved that the clause should be committed to the end that a
specification of the powers comprised in the general terms,
193
might be reported.

Immediately after this exchange, Randolph, himself still
smarting from the vote on the “Connecticut Compromise,”
194
asked that the Convention be adjourned.
The next day, Roger Sherman, who in the debate of May 31
had been the only delegate to vote against Resolution VI, now
suggested the Convention adopt a different formula. Madison’s
Notes are still somewhat sketchy and the portions in brackets he
later filled in from the (itself not always reliable) official Journal:
Mr. Sherman observed that it would be difficult to draw the
line between the powers of the Genl. Legislatures, and those
to be left to the States; that he did not like the definition
contained in the Resolution, and proposed in place of the
words ‘of individual legislation’ line 4 inclusive, to insert, ‘to
make laws binding on the people of the <United> States in all
cases <which may concern the common interests of the
193. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 17 (July 16).
194. Id. at 18; challenged, he quickly explained that he meant an adjournment only
for the day and not permanently. See also supra note 72 and accompanying text (noting
Randolph’s foul mood after his own ideas of compromise were rejected).
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Union>; but not to interfere with <the Government of the
individual States in any matters of internal police which
respect the Govt. of such States only, and wherein the
195
General> welfare of the U. States is not concerned.’

The passage must be read with care. If Madison’s account is
accurate, Sherman’s motion would have eliminated only the tail
end of Resolution VI (which, recall, read: “to legislate in all
cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which
the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the
exercise of individual Legislation.”). It is not altogether clear
what is being proposed, or what phrases would be replaced by
what. Sherman clearly wishes to protect the “internal police” of
the States from federal interference. The notes of John Lansing
for that day observe that “Mr. Sherman in the course of his
Remarks observed that the general Government could only have
the Regulation of Trade and some other matters of general
196
Concern and not to all the Affairs of the Union. The
scholarship on Resolution VI generally treats Sherman as the
great, stubborn defender of the powers of the States and Wilson
as the great nationalist, favorable to a broad grant of power. In
addition, these two delegates had, until the day before, been
locked in bitter dispute. But now Madison tells us that “Mr.
Wilson 2ded the [Sherman] amendment as better expressing the
197
general principle.” The entire passage is perplexing, and one
suspects that something important has been left out.
But the discussions continued. When it became clear (in
response to the prodding questions of Gouverneur Morris) that
Sherman’s proposal would not allow for direct taxation, it was
voted down by the Convention, 2–8. (Wilson’s vote is not
separately recorded, but the Pennsylvania delegation voted with
the majority.)
Gunning Bedford then moved to alter the language of
Resolution VI as follows, inserting the language in italics:
to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union,
and also in those to which the States are separately
incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States
may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation.

A worried Randolph remarked: “This is a formidable idea
indeed. It involves the power of violating all the laws and
195. Id. at 25 (July 17).
196. SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 56 (June 6).
197. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 26 (July 17).
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constitutions of the States, and of intermeddling with their
police.” After Bedford provided assurances that the new
language was no more “extensive or formidable” than
Randolph’s original proposal, the Bedford amendment was
198
adopted by the Convention, 8–2. It was Bedford’s version of
Resolution VI (with slight stylistic modifications) that made its
way to the Committee of Detail.
These various passages are too brief for us always to draw
firm conclusions about the intent of the delegates; but the
following points seem likely. First, the Convention as a whole
pretty clearly rejected the “expressly delegated” language of the
Articles: so far as can be seen without dissent. In the Virginia
ratification debates, Randolph argued that the language had
been “destructive” to the Union: even the passport system had
199
been difficult to justify. Secondly, most delegates appear to
have believed (Randolph, Rutledge, Gorham definitely, and
probably both Madison and Wilson) that the vague grant of the
Virginia Plan would eventually have to be replaced with a more
specific enumeration. Thirdly, although some delegates (notably
Madison and Wilson) may have hoped as well for a general grant
of legislative power, they appear not to have argued for such an
outcome—perhaps because they were still working for the
adoption of Madison’s national veto, which would have
accomplished some of the same ends. And finally, if the entire
Convention had intended a broad, general grant of national
power, and if an enumeration had been seen as incompatible
with such a grant, then one would have expected the
Committee’s Report to be met with protests. But there were no
such protests. If the Notes are correct, when the Committee
Report was presented, the idea of an enumeration was accepted
without a murmur. These facts may all be granted; but they still
leave open the question of whether the enumeration was
understood by the Convention to be exhaustive or illustrative.
Randolph’s enumeration in Draft IV needs to be seen in
light of this entire history. He had always favored an explicit
listing of the national legislative powers. There is no reason to
suspect him of acting ultra vires or of attempting to deceive the
Convention. After all, the Articles of Confederation contained
an enumeration, and the Convention had explicitly resolved, as
part of Resolution VI itself, “That the Legislature of the United
198. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 26–27 (July 17).
199. See Johnson, supra note 181, at 39–42.
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States ought to possess the legislative Rights vested in Congress
200
by the Confederation . . . .” As we have already seen, the
enumeration in the Articles was the principal source for
201
Randolph’s enumeration. The Convention had also, in the
Bedford resolution, charged the Committee to add additional
powers in areas where the states were “incompetent.” Here, too,
Randolph complied with instructions, explicitly adding the
powers to tax and to regulate commerce. Neither power was in
the least controversial: even Roger Sherman supported both, as
did the New Jersey Plan. If Randolph departed from
expectations, he did so in the direction of minimalism. His
enumeration granted to the national government virtually the
shortest list of powers compatible with the instructions of the
202
Convention.
c. Necessary and Proper
We now need to ask: What did Wilson think of all this?
What was his attitude towards the enumeration in the Randolph
Draft? I take it to be clear that he accepted the principles
embodied in Resolution VI, before, during, and after the
Convention, and agree with Mikhail that he either inspired the
language or wrote it. But to accept the principle of Resolution
VI is not necessarily to think that Resolution VI would serve as
good constitutional text. Randolph Madison, and Gorham
accepted the principle while explicitly declaring it to be a
placeholder for something more precise: Madison in 1833 treats
the point as obvious. Was Wilson’s attitude different? Perhaps;
but I see no clear evidence that it was. True, he expressed doubt
about the feasibility of an enumeration: but so did Randolph and
Madison. He was not shy about voicing contrary opinions; yet he
never—so far as Madison’s Notes reveal—objected to
enumeration on principle. There is no sign that he recoiled from
Randolph’s list, or that he pressed for additional powers to be
included. Moreover, even in his earliest writings on
parliamentary sovereignty, and subsequently in his opposition to
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, he repeatedly warned

200. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
202. Similarly for his drafting of the provisions concerning the federal courts. The
Convention language had said that the courts were to have jurisdiction over “such other
Questions as involve the national Peace and Harmony”; Randolph took this vague
formulation and made it precise. It is unlikely that he saw his enumeration any
differently.
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that legislatures could be as tyrannical as Kings: a caution
against thinking he would have favored writing the text of
Resolution VI into the Constitution.
Against this interpretation might be mentioned the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790, of which he was the leading
drafter. In his Lectures on Law from 1792 he noted that the
American Constitution contains no broad grant of powers,
whereas the Constitution of Pennsylvania vested the general
assembly “with every power necessary for a branch of the
203
legislature of a free state.” Of this contrast, Wilson says only,
“The reason is plain. The latter institutes a legislature with
general, the former, with enumerated, powers.”
And then there is the curious matter of Wilson’s
endorsement of Sherman’s motion as “better expressing the
sense” of Resolution VI. Wilson’s remark is perhaps not as
surprising as it first appears. Sherman proposed little more than
that matters affecting the union should be handled at the
national level, whereas matters affecting solely the states should
be handled by the states. So long as it was understood that this
formula, too, was a placeholder, and that the all-important
details remained to be specified, there was no reason for Wilson
not to endorse the motion.
In other words, I see no ground to think that Wilson would
have seen Randolph’s enumeration as illegitimate. But still,
there was a problem. The balance between state and federal
power needed to be calibrated correctly, and the provisions so
far adopted by the Committee would almost certainly have
struck Wilson as tilting things too much toward the states. This
brings us to the necessary and proper clause, which I take to be
his response.
The Randolph draft (Document IV) contains numerous
provisions in the handwriting of Rutledge. Presumably, these
were made during the course of a Committee meeting, with
Rutledge presiding. He inserted into the enumeration a clause
prohibiting the states from emitting paper bills of credit, and
then, quickly scrawled across the top of the next page, “That
l
e
Trials for Crim . Offenses be in the State where the Off was
d
com —by Jury—And a right to make all Laws necessary to carry
204
the foregoing Powers into Execu –.” This scribble is the first
203. WILSON, supra note 183, at 870. Wilson misquotes slightly; for the actual text,
see THORPE, supra note 67, at 3094.
204. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 144; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
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version of what was to evolve into the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
It is not possible to say which Committee member or
members instigated the inclusion of such a clause; but we can
make a guess. Randolph can almost certainly be ruled out. On
September 10 he listed as one of his principal reasons for not
signing the Constitution “the general clause concerning neces205
sary and proper laws.” The formulation of the clause in Draft
206
IV is weaker than the final version in Draft IX, and might not
have been as objectionable to Randolph; still, it is hard to
imagine that he instigated even the weaker version. Rutledge
was almost as skeptical about unrestricted national power as
Randolph: he, too, is an unlikely candidate. Ellsworth, who
appears never to have spoken on this issue, is something of a
cipher; and Gorham is not enough of a lawyer.
The likeliest candidate is therefore Wilson. Of the
Committee members, he is the one most sympathetic to national
power. Moreover, in Document V—his brief initial sketch, likely
written before the Committee first met—his outline indicates
that he planned “To treat of the Powers of the legislative” and
then “To except from those Powers certain specified Cases.”
These remarks are elliptical: but it sounds as though he was
thinking in terms of a more general grant of powers that would
then be limited by specific restrictions.
We do not know the precise form the necessity clause took
in Draft VI/VIII—it would have been on the missing folio sheet.
The original scrawled version in Document IV had spoken only
of “a right to make all Laws necessary to carry the foregoing
Powers into Execu –.” In Draft IX this idea appears in a
significantly stronger form: “to make all Laws that shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into full and complete
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested, by
this Constitution, in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof.” The second cancelled
expression was restored in the printed Committee Report, and
(with some minor alterations to punctuation and capitalization)
the entire clause made its way into the final text of the
Constitution. The physical page here is almost a fair copy. The
quoted passage seems to have been smoothly and fully written
supra note 20, at 277.
205. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 563 (Sept. 10).
206. Mikhail rightly emphasizes this point; supra note 182.
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out, without interlineations, before the deleted words were
crossed out. (I presume, on a matter of this importance, that
Wilson did not first write the cancelled phrase, then continue
with the rest as an afterthought. Incidentally, although the page
contains some marginalia by Rutledge, the cancellations here
appear to be Wilson’s.) That Wilson on this page tinkered with
207
the formulation is perhaps another small hint of authorship.
At this point we must be careful not to attribute to Wilson
and the members of the Committee greater foresight than in
1787 they could have possessed. Wilson may perhaps have hoped
that the Necessary and Proper Clause would open the door to an
expansive view of national powers. He may perhaps have hoped
that it would cause the enumeration to be understood to be
illustrative rather than exhaustive. But there is no clear evidence
that he analyzed matters in these terms. The surviving evidence
even for Wilson—let alone for the Convention as a whole—is
patchy and inconclusive. It should be remembered that the
specific “necessary and proper” terminology was novel; the
public understanding of the clause was unpredictable;
McCulloch still lay far in the future; and, for all anybody could
tell, the clause might have been construed narrowly. One thinks
of the Privileges and Immunities Clauses, or the guarantee of
republican government. That the interpretation of the clause was
contested for so long, pitting constitutional thinkers of the
stature of Jefferson and Madison against Hamilton and
Marshall, is a warning that the mere act of drafting the language
still left a great deal unsettled. To us, after more than two
centuries of constitutional history, it is obvious that the strong
version of the Necessary and Proper Clause is fundamental. But
it might not have seemed that way at the time. I note in passing
that Wilson’s chapter “Of the Legislative Department” in his
Lectures scarcely mentions the clause. Almost as an afterthought, he mentions only the narrow version of the clause,
207. I note in passing one further point. The famous interpretation of the Necessary
and Proper Clause in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316 (1819), follows the analysis provided by Hamilton in his memorandum concerning
the constitutionality of a national bank, submitted to Washington in February, 1791. The
bank itself Hamilton had proposed in his Report on a National Bank, submitted to
Congress in December, 1790. A full copy of that lengthy Report, in Hamilton’s
handwriting, is among the Wilson papers at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. It is
suggestive that the argument about the constitutionality of the bank turned on the
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and that Hamilton, as a former
member of the Convention, knew of the role Wilson had played; but the precise nature
of their communications cannot be further reconstructed. For further details, see Ewald,
supra note 42, at 908–10.
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granting it two sentences in the penultimate paragraph and
saying only that it was intended to insure that the enumerated
208
powers not be “nugatory.” One has the impression that many
other matters struck him as more important.
d. Supremacy
With enumeration and the Necessary and Proper Clause
behind us, the remaining federalism provisions can be handled
more rapidly.
The development of the Supremacy Clause took a strange
trajectory. The Articles of Confederation contained in Article
XIII what might be called a “quasi-supremacy clause,” declaring
that the states were to abide by decisions of Congress, and were
to observe the Articles themselves “inviolably.” But this
somewhat overly-optimistic formulation left no scope for
adjudication of difficult cases and no mechanism for
enforcement. At bottom, the system depended on voluntary
compliance by the states. The Virginia Plan had sought to deal
with this issue by two devices: (i) a national veto by Congress
over the state legislatures; and (ii) the power of the Congress to
call forth the national military to force recalcitrant states into
line. Madison appears to have drafted both provisions; but even
he almost immediately expressed serious reservations about the
209
second. Nevertheless, it appears to have been universally
agreed that some sort of strengthening of the national powers
was called for, and the New Jersey Plan (introduced in June 15)
proposed the following language:
Resd. that all Acts of the U. States in Congrs. made by virtue
& in pursuance of the powers hereby & by the articles of
confederation vested in them, and all Treaties made &
ratified under the authority of the U. States shall be the
supreme law of the respective States so far forth as those Acts
or Treaties shall relate to the said States or their Citizens, and
that the Judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby
in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the
210
Individual States to the contrary notwithstanding . . . .

Curiously, the New Jersey Plan also provided for calling forth
the power of the national military. In response, Randolph
objected that the proper remedy was not military coercion, but a
208. WILSON, supra note 183, at 872.
209. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 54 (May 31).
210. Id. at 245 (June 15).
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211

national government acting directly on individuals. After the
rejection of the New Jersey Plan, the Convention returned to the
Virginia Plan and for the next month was consumed by the
“great debate” over proportional representation. A month later,
the day after the “Connecticut Compromise,” the Convention
voted to reject the Madison national veto. In its stead, Luther
Martin moved to reinstate the language quoted above from the
New Jersey Plan, language which (with a few inconsequential
changes) was incorporated into the Convention resolutions
212
forwarded to the Committee of Detail. The language appears
in Wilson’s Draft IX, but with one major change: “any Thing in
the Constitutions or Laws of the several States to the Contrary
213
notwithstanding.” It is possible that Paterson and Martin had
deliberately formulated the original language so as to permit the
states to preserve their autonomy; but some Committee member
with a sharp eye plugged the gap. As with the Necessary and
Proper Clause, the likeliest suspect is Wilson.
e. Restrictions on the States
The Convention resolutions had not contained a list of
enumerated powers; nor did they contain a list of restrictions on
the states. Just as the Randolph draft had looked to the Articles
of Confederation for its list of enumerated powers, so Draft IX
looks to the same source (Article VI) for a list of prohibitions on
the states. This was the first version of what would eventually
become Article I, §10. Most of these restrictions were taken
more-or-less directly from the Articles, and did not provoke
controversy when the Committee reported them back to the
211. Id. at 256 (June 16).
212. COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 245. In the Randolph draft, a
Supremacy Clause appears in Rutledge’s hand,and reads as follows: “All laws of a
particular state, repugnant hereto, shall be void, and in the decision thereon, which shall
be vested in the supreme judiciary, all incidents without which the general principles
cannot be satisfied shall be considered, as involved in the general principle.” 2
CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 144; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20,
at 277. This text was for some reason then struck out. I note the extraordinary
awkwardness of the formulation, which is characteristic of Rutledge—and which
provides at least a minor indication that Wilson was responsible for most of the actual
drafting of the far more lucid Committee Report.
213. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 169. Wilson’s full version reads:
The Acts of the Legislature of the United States made in Pursuance of this
Constitution, and all Treaties made under the Authority of the United States
shall be the supreme Law of the several States, and of their Citizens and
Inhabitants; and the Judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in their
Decisions, any Thing in the Constitutions or Laws of the several States to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
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214

Convention. No doubt most delegates took it for granted that
the prohibitions contained in the Articles would continue. The
most significant change is the inclusion of a prohibition on
coining money or issuing paper bills of credit. This was not
controversial at the Convention, though it engendered debate in
some of the state ratifying conventions. Wilson certainly favored
such a restriction; but so did most of the other delegates, and the
matter first appears in the Randolph draft, inserted in Rutledge’s
handwriting. There is no reason to attribute this change to any
215
Committee member in particular.
f. Miscellaneous Federalism Provisions
Draft IX also contains three further provisions relating to
federalism. The first is in Wilson’s handwriting: a guarantee to
each state of a republican form of government. This provision
had been specified in the Convention resolutions, and Wilson
simply adopted the language with minor changes. In the margin,
in Rutledge’s handwriting, is a version of the privileges and
216
immunities clause, and the notation, “Full Faith & Credit &c.”
Neither of these provisions had been formally discussed in the
214. The principal points taken from the Articles—sometimes with modifications to
the language—are as follows: The states are prohibited from entering into treaties of
alliance with foreign powers or other states; from imposing duties on imports; from
keeping troops or ships in time of peace; from issuing letters of marque and reprisal;
from engaging in war; and from granting titles of nobility. Id.
215. The Articles of Confederation had granted Congress the power (by a supermajority of nine votes) to coin money and (by a simple majority) to regulate the alloy of
coin struck by the states. The Articles did not prohibit the states from coining money nor
from issuing paper currency. This was of course an issue of fundamental importance—
socially divisive and one of the principal reasons, much discussed by Beard and the
progressive historians, for the calling of a Constitutional Convention. Already in 1786
Madison was denouncing the “folly” of paper money, which was at the heart of his
famous list of “Vices”. MADISON, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 9
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 56, at 349. See generally Mary M. Schweitzer, State-Issued
Currency and the Ratification of the U.S. Constitution, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 311 (1989)
(detailing the critical nature of the paper money supply within the United States at the
time of ratification). The Randolph draft shows numerous insertions and deletions on
this point, mostly in the hand of Rutledge, but in essence gave to Congress the exclusive
right to coin money and prohibited the states from issuing paper money unless
authorized by Congress. The idea was already contained in the Pinckney Plan, which the
Committee had at its disposal; but there is no reason to think that Rutledge or Randolph
could not have come up with the prohibitions for themselves. Draft IX essentially
adopted the Randolph position, which made its way into the final Committee Report.
Wilson himself would have gone further. When the proposal was debated in Convention
on August 28, he favored making the prohibition on the issuance of paper money by the
states absolute. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 439.
216. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 174; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 361. Farrand mistakenly does not record that the insertions are in
Rutledge’s hand.
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Convention; both were taken (via Charles Pinckney) from the
Articles of Confederation. Both found their way into the
Committee Report and thence into the Constitution.
This has been a long analysis of the federalism provisions;
let me pull together the main threads. It seems to me that behind
the Committee documents we can discern a subtle tug-of-war,
with the initial Randolph-Rutledge drafts favoring state power,
and Draft IX taking a more Wilsonian position. I believe the
strong Necessary and Proper Clause, the prohibitions on the
states, and the formulation of the Supremacy Clause to be
primarily Wilson’s handiwork. But full proof is impossible; and
in any case the point should not be exaggerated. Wilson would
have needed to secure at least two other committee votes; and as
I argued, the differences between himself and Randolph (or
217
even Roger Sherman) are hardly an unbridgeable chasm.
2. The Executive
Let us briefly recall the treatment of the executive in the
Randolph Draft. The Convention resolutions had stipulated as
the powers of the executive only “the power to carry into
Execution the national Laws,” the power to appoint officers “in
cases not otherwise provided for,” and the veto power.
Randolph, in keeping with his distrust of the executive as the
217. Let me here briefly indicate my position on the “Resolution VI” controversy,
supra note 180 and accompanying text. It seems to me that there are some factual slips
and omissions in Balkin’s account of Resolution VI, but that they do not vitiate his larger
argument. He is correct that Resolution VI (as amended by Bedford) was settled upon as
a statement of the general principle the Convention wished the Committee of Detail to
discharge: even on the “placeholder” view, this is clearly true. It is equally true that
Randolph and Wilson understood themselves to be carrying out the Convention’s
instructions: Mikhail’s observation only strengthens the point.
Everything now turns on what it means to “discharge” Resolution VI. Crudely put,
there are two choices. (1) One might view Resolution VI as mere scaffolding, a
temporary structure to be dismantled and discarded once the task is complete. On this
view, once the enumeration of powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause have been
adopted, Resolution VI has been discharged without residue and has no further role to
perform. (There are of course areas of law where such a view is almost a precondition of
sanity: one does not wish to argue every issue of tax law from first principles.)
(2) On the other view, Resolution VI retains a residual use. Explicitly adopted by
the Convention as a statement of what they intended the enumeration of powers to
accomplish, it is now available, on originalist grounds, as an interpretive principle for
understanding the powers listed in the enacted text.
Historical facts about the Convention cannot settle this matter; indeed, although the
delegates did not formulate the choice in this way, it is reasonably clear that Randolph
would have inclined to the first view and Wilson to the second. My own view (which I
shall not argue) is that the second view is the more defensible. But that is now a claim of
legal philosophy, not of history; and to that extent the historical criticisms of Balkin
misunderstand the argument.
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“foetus of monarchy,” provided that the executive was to be
elected by Congress and to be ineligible for a second term. The
Convention to this time had not discussed the question of who
was to control foreign affairs. Randolph’s original Draft IV
assigned the principal powers (over treaties and appointment of
ambassadors) to the Senate: the executive only had the right to
receive ambassadors. Randolph indeed at one point had
suggested that the Senate ought to be perpetually in session,
218
“perhaps to aid the executive.” On his conception the chief
executive was to be kept weak and many executive functions
performed by the Senate.
The Rutledge annotations (presumably reflecting the work
of the Committee) considerably strengthen the list of powers,
and it is likely that Wilson, the most vigorous advocate at the
Convention for a strong presidency, was in the forefront of the
changes. The executive is now the commander-in-chief of the
state militias and of the national military; has his salary placed
beyond legislative control; is given an enhanced appointment
power; is authorized to make recommendations to Congress; and
219
is given the power to pardon. None of these changes would
have been congenial to Randolph.
We do not possess the folio sheet for the executive in Draft
VI/VIII. Our next glimpse is Draft IX; Wilson, working from this
enhanced list (and relying at many points on the linguistic
formulations in the Pinckney Plan) worked up a recognizable
first version of what was to become Article II, Sect. 2 of the
Constitution. In particular, he began with the words: “The
Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a single
Person.” This “vesting clause” and the way in which Wilson
formulated the articles, situated the powers of the presidency
firmly in the hands of the chief executive and precluded the sort
220
of legislative interference Randolph had contemplated. Wilson
was not able in Committee to retrieve the foreign affairs powers
that Randolph had assigned to the Senate; he no doubt decided
to bide his time and to argue the matter in Convention. In any
case, a presidency that had come to the Committee with little
more than the veto power and the power to make appointments
218. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 415 (June 25).
219. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 145–46; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 277–78. All the additions are in the hand of Rutledge. Originally the
appointment power had read, “to appoint to offices not otherwise provided for”;
Rutledge appended “by the constitution.”
220. See THACH, supra note 52, at 102–03.
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(subject to Congressional control), left with a much broader
range of powers that had effectually been insulated from
Congressional interference. It is difficult not to see Wilson as the
221
principal architect of these provisions.
3. The Judiciary
As we saw earlier, Randolph’s draft introduced, in a
recognizable form, much of the specification of the jurisdiction
222
of the federal courts. In Rutledge’s handwriting on that draft
(which likely reflects Committee deliberations) are only two
substantive additions, giving the federal courts jurisdiction over
admiralty cases, and over disputes “between a State & a Citizen
223
or Citizens of another State.” Wilson could have proposed
either of these additions and certainly would have approved
both; but there is no particular reason to attribute them to him
rather than to Randolph or Rutledge. For Draft IX’s treatment
of the judiciary, Wilson essentially took the annotated Randolph
Draft and polished the language; the boundary between original
and appellate jurisdiction is specified with more precision and
cases involving ambassadors are added to the list. But in
substance, the draft adds little new.
Wilson’s text of Document IX is essentially the draft of the
Constitution presented by the Committee to the Convention on
Monday, August 6. On August 5, some sixty copies were secretly
printed by a local printer named John Dunlap for the use of the
224
delegates. This printed text contained one significant further
addition: the first version of the Treason Clause. Because
treason had been a special concern of Wilson’s since his
unsuccessful defense of accused loyalists and Quakers during the
225
war, this clause, too, is likely to reflect his handiwork.
221. This is also the conclusion of Thach’s meticulous study. Wilson’s various
interventions on the presidency during Act I and Act III of the Convention are discussed
in detail in Ewald, supra note 42.
222. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (defining the jurisdiction for the
Judiciary). The original language of the Convention Resolutions on this jurisdictional
point was extremely vague and read as follows: “Resolved[.] That the Jurisdiction of the
national Judiciary shall extend to Cases arising under the Laws passed by the general
Legislature, and to such other Questions as involve the national Peace and Harmony.” 2
CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 132–33.
223. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 147; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 279.
224. Id. at 175. Numerous copies of this Report have survived; Wilson’s apparently
exists, but is in private hands.
225. See James William Hurst, Treason in the United States: II. The Constitution, 58
HARV. L. REV. 395, 404–06 (1945) (describing Wilson’s “particular interest” in the
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III. CONCLUSIONS
This has been a long analysis of the work of the Committee
of Detail. Even so, it is far from complete. There remain two
further documents in the Wilson archive; both relate to the plan
submitted by Charles Pinckney at the start of the Convention.
The story of these documents is complex, as is the analysis of
their influence on the work of the Committee; so I shall defer a
discussion of Pinckney to another occasion. There is also the
question of the specific influence of the Committee Report on
the Convention. The printed Report was distributed to the
delegates and provided the framework for the debates in Act III:
one wants to know how the Report was received and what
happened to the controversial additions. (The Committee,
incidentally, continued to meet during Act III; but we have no
226
documentation of its internal activities. ) But these matters lie
beyond the scope of this Article.
Let me now pull together the main threads. We can divide
the contributions of the Committee into three rough categories:
(α) Bookkeeping Contributions. On many matters—indeed,
on most matters—the Committee was simply writing up the
explicit decisions of the Convention, or adding provisions from
the Articles that everybody took for granted. (The Privileges and
Immunities Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause fall into
this category.) On these matters, it is safe to assume that the
Committee was unanimous, and it would be idle to search for
individual influences. (It is likely that Wilson incorporated into
the Constitution many pieces of nomenclature taken from
Charles Pinckney: but that is a point about terminology, not
about substance.)
(β) Controversial Insertions. These are the additions that
had no basis in the prior work of the Convention and that were
ultimately rejected in August. They include especially the “deep
South” provisions on slavery, on navigation acts, and on taxation
of exports, as well as the resolutions on such matters as the
power of the states to set the salaries of their representatives in
Congress.
These provisions make their first appearance in the
Randolph draft and are extremely important to the internal

Treason Clause).
226. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 321–22 (Aug. 18); 334–37 (Aug. 20);
383 (Aug. 23).
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history of the Convention. As is well known, they caused
immense controversy for most of the month of August:
historians have discussed the issue of slavery at length and have
invariably (and doubtless correctly) detected the hand of
Rutledge in the Committee’s recommendations. Within the
Committee he must have had the support of Randolph and of at
least one of the New Englanders. Here, Wilson, far from being
the dominant member of the Committee, was certainly in the
minority and possibly in a minority of one.
Whether the enumeration of congressional powers should
also be included in class (β) is, as we saw, a debatable point. On
the one hand, the enumeration first appears in the Randolph
draft and is of a piece with his anti-federal tendencies. On the
other, the enumeration is grounded in the Articles and most
members of the Convention appear to have expected such an
enumeration to be included. Wilson might well have favored a
broader and less trammeled grant of legislative power than did
the other Committee members; but the surviving evidence leaves
the specifics of his position open to speculation. In any case, that
enumeration survived the rest of the summer in a way the other
proposals in (β) did not.
The initial Randolph draft, in addition to the controversial
insertions, also reflects a powerful tendency to restrict the
powers of the national government, to cabin the executive, and
to enhance the powers of the states. Wilson is unlikely to have
sympathized with any of this and especially with the treatment of
the executive. If one carefully examines the sequence of drafts,
from Randolph’s Draft IV to the Committee’s Draft IX, one
sees a clear progression—not so much by a subtraction of the
controversial early insertions as by the addition of provisions
that bring the final Committee Report closer to the position of
Wilson. How exactly this transformation was accomplished is
impossible to say: presumably there was a tug-of-war, but the
details cannot now be reconstructed. This brings me to the last
category:
(γ) Substantive Modifications. In this category fall all those
provisions not specifically mandated by the Convention (and
thus not in (α)), but not so controversial as to fall within (β).
Most of these modifications made their way into the final draft
of the Constitution, with remarkably little further debate. It is
important to emphasize that little in this category was entirely
without precedent. There are exceptions, but almost every clause
of the Committee Report has antecedents either in the Articles,

!!!EWALD-282-THECOMMITTEEOFDETAILACCEPTED.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL

12/13/2012 2:08 PM

281

or in the state Constitutions, or in one of the three plans—
Virginia, New Jersey, and Pinckney—that the Convention
consigned to Committee. So here it was a matter, not of creating
entirely from scratch, but of selecting, of choosing what to
include from the mass of available materials, of filling in details,
of formulating appropriate language, and of organizing the
whole into a coherent text.
It is in category (γ) that Wilson’s role is likely to have been
227
the greatest. Randolph and Rutledge were clumsy draftsmen.
The fact that the Committee drafts are all in Wilson’s
handwriting; his skill as a drafter of legislation; his attention to
fine shades of language; the existence among his papers of his
own careful transcriptions of the Pinckney and New Jersey plans,
all point to his deep involvement in the process. And there is a
further matter. Wilson lived in Philadelphia. His house, with his
desk and papers, was just across Chestnut Street from the State
House. It is hard to imagine that the other members of the
Committee sat at his elbow, patiently watching him write the
successive drafts in longhand. It is far more likely that he did this
work by himself, at home, presenting the results to the
Committee for discussion and comment.
There is an instructive experiment that the reader can
perform at this point. If one takes photocopies of the
Convention resolutions, the state constitutions (especially of
Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia), the texts of the New
Jersey Plan and the Pinckney Plan, and the Articles of
Confederation, and, with scissors, cuts them into individual
clauses, spreads them out on the floor, and then rearranges them
thematically, one quickly becomes aware of the vast range of
possibilities: in these circumstances, the power to select, the
power to organize, is also the power to create. And there is also
the power to omit. We noticed, besides the positive
contributions, also one conspicuous negative contribution of the
Committee, most likely attributable to Randolph: the decision
(connected, like so much else, to the issue of slavery) not to
include a Bill of Rights.
Somewhat surprisingly, Randolph turns out to be more
important than has generally been recognized. Wilson and
Rutledge are typically assumed to have been the principal actors;
that is likely correct, but it is in fact extremely difficult to assign
specific clauses confidently to either. Randolph, on the other
227.

See supra note 115.
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hand, seems to have produced the first draft of the Constitution
by himself, working before the Committee first met. His draft
contains several hobby-horses of his own and no hobby-horses of
anybody else. As a result, certain novel provisions in that draft
can plausibly be credited to him—notably the enumeration of
powers and the specification of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. The former had precedent in the Articles; but the latter
was new. Randolph was a considerable lawyer and later served
as Attorney General: there is no reason to suppose him
incapable of having drafted these provisions on his own. If so
(and despite his failure to sign) he must be counted as one of the
greatest contributors to the final document.
What of Madison? What of the claim that “With Wilson on
228
[the Committee], it mattered little that Madison was off”? If
the suggestion is that Madison exercised control and that Wilson
was simply carrying through his agenda, the claim is entirely
lacking in evidence. In the first place, the provisions to which
Wilson is most likely to have contributed have more to do with
his own constitutional ideas than with Madison’s; and beyond
that there is no sign that he ever regarded himself as acting in
the service of anybody else. It is true that Madison subsequently
endorsed much of the work of the Committee; and it is also true
that, throughout the Convention, Madison and Wilson often
found themselves in agreement. But beyond that, if there is any
evidence of a direct and specifically Madisonian influence on the
work of the Committee of Detail, I confess I have been unable
to find it. Randolph’s concentration of powers in the Senate may
owe something to him; but his most characteristic and distinctive
ideas—the congressional veto, the Council of revision—are
nowhere to be seen.
What about Wilson himself? Wilson was deeply involved in
the drafting process, and the Committee report undoubtedly
bears many traces of his influence. It is incorrect, however, to
exaggerate this point and to characterize the Committee as “a
committee of Wilson and four others.” Randolph and Rutledge
in particular were powerful countervailing influences—certainly
in category (β), but no doubt in (γ) as well. What provisions
show the marks of his handiwork? As we saw, it is impossible to
link specific clauses to him with the same confidence that is
possible for Randolph. But the likeliest candidates are: the
opening words, “We the People of the States”; the strong version
228. BRANT, supra note 31.
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of the Necessary and Proper Clause; the Treason Clause; the
Supremacy Clause (with regard to state constitutions); and much
of the detailed structure of the powers of the presidency. These
are issues that had particular salience to Wilson, and to which he
devoted considerable thought. They are not visible in the
Randolph draft. More importantly, they would have been out of
character for either Rutledge or Randolph, and they are too
legally subtle for it to be likely that they emanated from
Ellsworth or Gorham. There may be other provisions for which
Wilson bears the primary responsibility, but those seem the most
likely.
But these ascriptions of responsibility are likelihoods rather
than certainties. They cannot be established beyond all doubt;
and in any case, each of the contributions of the Committee
would have needed the assent of at least three committee
members.
That said, the following can be asserted with confidence.
The Committee of Detail was not just an interlude in the history
of the Convention and not just a matter of “tidying up.” That is
true at most for the items in category (α); but manifestly false for
(β) and (γ). For our purposes, the category to focus on is (γ). It
was the Committee that worked out, in a recognizable form, the
main elements of American federalism and wrote them into the
Constitution: the enumeration of powers, the Necessary and
Proper Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the prohibitions on the
states, the specification of the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
and certain aspects of the presidency. Those things had scarcely
been discussed in the prior work of the Convention; they were
added by the Committee, and they were to survive into the final
document, for the most part with only slight modifications to the
language. These elements are so fundamental to the
Constitution that they entitle the Committee to be counted as
“Act II” of a three-act Convention, fully comparable in
importance to what went before and what came after. Indeed,
Oliver Ellsworth is reported to have made this very point to his
son in 1802:
He, Judge E., told me one day as I was reading a Newspaper to
him containing Eulogiums upon the late General Washington,
which among other things ascribed to him the founding of the
American Government to which Judge Ellsworth objected,
saying President Washington’s influence while in the
Convention was not very great, at least not much as to the
forming of the present Constitution of the United States in
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1787, which Judge Ellsworth said was drawn by himself and
five others, viz.—General Alexander Hamilton, Gorham of
Mass, deceased, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, Rutledge of
229
South Carolina and Madison of Virginia.

Ellsworth’s memory may have been faulty, or his son may have
misheard or misremembered his words; but his list is just the
Committee of Five, with Hamilton substituted for Randolph,
and the entirely justified inclusion of Madison among the
principal framers.
Beyond those observations, there are three broad morals to
this story. The first is that the mere presence or absence of
archival documents matters greatly to the way we conceive the
origins of the Constitution: and the survival of the documents is
in large measure a matter of happenstance. Secondly, the
documentation concerning the Committee of Detail is more dry
and technical than the dramatic story contained in Madison’s
Notes; and that very fact (as well as the way in which the
documents are reprinted by Farrand) has tended to deflect the
historiography of the Convention away from the actual legal
accomplishments—away, that is, from constitutional law—and
towards the human-interest story of the events of the
Convention itself. I take it to be clear that this is a misplaced
emphasis.
The third moral is perhaps the most important. In working
with the Committee of Detail manuscripts, it is of great
importance not to let interpretation run ahead of the evidence.
In particular, it is important not to ascribe to the Committee
members an understanding of their task that nobody would have
had in 1787. Many matters of central constitutional importance
were not worked out until years later; and although the members
of the Convention were unquestionably farsighted, they were
not clairvoyants. The implications even of some of their most
fundamental decisions could not at the time have been foreseen.
In analyzing the work of the Committee of Detail I have
tried to establish what can be known about its contributions to
the Constitution: but it is equally important to take note of what
cannot be known. It is natural to wonder, for instance, what the
members of the Committee, when they drafted the Necessary
and Proper Clause, thought its precise relationship was to the
enumeration of powers; and it is disappointing to find that the

229. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 396–97.
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evidence does not supply an unambiguous answer. But there is
no way to tell. At bottom, the only evidence we have for
reconstructing the original intent of the Framers is a few old
scraps of paper. If one undertakes some painstaking archival and
textual work, there are indeed many important things to say
about their intentions. But the documentary sources are
problematic; they are incomplete; they undoubtedly contain
distortions and hidden agendas; and there is absolutely no
reason to suppose that they are able to answer any anachronistic
question that lawyers are capable of asking. At some point, the
evidence simply runs out.

